Married or not. A multifactor approach to marriage and cohabitation in Canada, 1991–2011.

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Introduction

The choice between being married or living together as an unmarried couples is commonly envisioned or studied from either one of two opposite perspectives each rooted in a different institutional context. In the American perspective, embodied in a tradition that goes from Oppenheimer (Oppenheimer, Kalmijn, and Lim 1997; Oppenheimer 2003) to Perelli-Harris (Perelli-Harris et al. 2010; Perelli-Harris and Gerber 2011), living together without being married and especially having children while living in an unmarried cohabiting relationship is first and foremost a consequence of deprivation. In the European perspective, exemplified by the Second Demographic Transition Theory (Van de Kaa 1987; Lesthaeghe 2010), living in an unmarried cohabiting relationship with or without children is a by-product of a transformation of the society in which individuals are free to organise their private life outside of the interference of the State.

In this paper, we look at the choice between living a married or an unmarried couple as the product of a multifactor process that is not reducible to the encompassing unidimensional macrosocial structural difference assumed by each of the two perspectives. In plain words, couples who decide to live together without being married come to make that decision for reasons specific to their couple or specific to the two individuals that make the couple.

Many factors could be considered as part of the process that leads to getting married or not. In this paper, we focus on three that are known to play a role in couple formation and dynamics: endogamy and exogamy, homogamy and heterogamy, and, finally, the economic component of within-couple gender relations. Our general hypotheses are that as a rule, characteristics that make the couple close to what may be taken as the norm increase the probability of being married whereas characteristics that strengthen the economic position of the woman in the couple increase the probability of living in a consensual union. These factors should play a part in the decision

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process whatever the institutional context as long as it does not forbid consensual union and whether this context is best described by the perspective by the American or the European perspective.

The plan of the paper is as follows. First, we discuss the differences between the institutional context in which the American and the European perspectives have developed and explain why each of them takes its full meaning in the social, economic and political context in which it was developed. Second, we review the literature on the roles of ascribed and achieved characteristics, endogamy and exogamy, and endogamy and homogamy in marriage formation and examine how the such literature can provide insights on the factors that lead to getting married or living together. Third, we provide an overview of the literature on the economic aspects of gender relations and marriage, again looking for insights on factors relevant for our purpose.

We test our hypotheses using Canadian data. Canada is convenient for our purpose because of regional differences that allow comparing two contexts, one best described by the American perspective where consensual union is relatively uncommon and one best described by the European perspective where consensual union is widespread. We use census data from 1991, 2001 and 2011. Census data does not allow modelling the process that leads to getting married or not, but in contains detailed information on both members of the couple, including quite detailed information on their individual income. This kind of detailed information is typically not collected on the two members of a couple in life course surveys. We thus provide a literature review of marriage and consensual union in Canada.

Overall, our results match our hypotheses and the departures provide new insights on some aspects of the process.

Institutional Differences. Private Law and Social Policy

Marriage is a multifaceted institution whose main historical function was the orderly reproduction of society and of the groups that comprise it. However, historically, marriage as an institution also had the function of regulating the economic life of the family as the unit of population renewal and social reproduction. The two functions were intertwined, but still they were distinct. That said, marriage as an institution has been ever-changing. For our purpose, which involves an interest in the role of educational homogamy in the process of couple formation, it is necessary to understand the institution as it was before gender equality was thought of as desirable or even possible. This second function of marriage is best understood by looking at private law which explicitly regulates it. Canada is instructive to this regard as the private law of the mainly English-speaking provinces

is based on the English common law whereas that of Quebec is based on Civil law. In other words, the two main private law systems of the Western world are found in the same country, which is especially convenient as some of the most defining characteristics of marriage are best understood by comparing it across these two systems of private law.

Marriage as it existed in French law at the beginning of the 20th century was shaped mainly during the 16th and 17th century when the kings developed their administration using jurists, then the only category of highly educated people apart from clerics and physicians, and making them into a new branch of the nobility. These "Nobles of the Gown" had to pay an annual fee to keep their offices, but they had the right to transmit them to their heirs. As prominent members of the provincial parliaments and as officers of the king, they had considerable influence in the rewriting of the many customs of the French provinces –by then, customs had been written and these parliaments had the power to amend them–, and use it to infuse an interpretation of some aspects of late Roman law governing marriage that helped them consolidate their control of the family wealth and ensure the intergenerational transmission of their wealth and offices. Whereas most customs established a clear distinction between the property that was owned jointly by the spouses and the property that was owned separately by each of them, and let the woman some power over the administration of what was her own, they used their position to limit this power of the married woman by enlarging the role of the husband as administrator of the wealth of the family. Controlling fully the intergenerational transmission of wealth and offices proved more difficult. In all the customs of the kingdom, parents were forbidden to deprive children from their inheritance, and the primary tool of estate planning was the marriage contract rather than the will. The marriage contract typically included the transmission of a fraction of the family wealth to the son or daughter upon marriage, and these contracts were typically negotiated by the fathers of the two children soon to be married. By law, the marriage contract had to be drawn up before the wedding: it could not be drafted nor amended afterwards. The weak point of the system was clandestine marriages, that is the secret marriage of two children without the consent of their parents, which the Church deemed illicit, but nonetheless perfectly valid: a clandestine marriage imposed on two families an economic alliance they likely did not want and deprived both of their main tool of estate planning. The issue was not settled before France used its influence on the Council of Trent to impose a reformation of marriage that involved its public solemnisation before witnesses and the parish vicar as well as its public registration as conditions of its validity. The extended control of the husband over the family resources was eventually accompanied with the obligation to properly maintain his wife. Interestingly, maintaining the children emerged as a shared obligation

of both the father and the mother. Furthermore, family relationships arising from marriage were used to implement a system of reciprocal maintenance duties that involved father, mother and children, but also extended to grandparents and grandchildren who could not provide for themselves.

Marriage in English law developed as a similar system of control and protection of the married woman and the children, as well as needy relatives, but from a different point of departure and using different legal mechanisms. In common law, upon marriage, with the exception of truly personal items, whatever property of the woman becomes property of her husband and will never return to her, not even by the dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce. The husband must properly maintain his wife, but has no obligation to maintain his children. The common law provides rules for the transmission of wealth in the absence of a will, but the husband and father is expected to write a will in which he details what his surviving wife and children will receive. Given the way common law emerged from the fog of the past, English men never had to reform it to gain full control of the family wealth and its transmission to the next generation: the husband owned everything and the power to disinherit was an effective tool of estate planning for the father. Apparently, the lack of a duty to provide for the children did not become a concern before the 'enclosure movement' that culminated during the 16th century and deprived a large fraction of England and Wales's peasants from their livelihood by privatising pieces of land that were previously deemed common. The droves of the newly created poor became a public nuisance that the royal government, lacking the power to amend private law, resorted to deal with using a series of ordinances known as the 'Poor's Laws'. The main provisions of these ordinances imposed on local authorities the duty to provide for the poor under their jurisdiction, giving them in return the right to recover whatever they spent for the maintenance of a poor from their relatives. The list of the relatives who could be sued by the local authorities for the maintenance of the poor was the same as the list of relatives who were imposed a maintenance duty in French private law. This should not come as a surprise as this list is derived, with some creativity, from late Roman law, and as the English scholarly jurists who wrote the royal ordinances were trained in English universities that taught Roman law and Canon law rather than common law, which was not taught in faculties of law before the middle of the 18th century.

Given the differences between French and English law, women's emancipation focused on different features of the institution. In France, the married woman kept ownership of her own property and upon marriage got ownership of half the marital property. Upon the dissolution of the marriage or separation from bed and board, she gained control of all she already owned,

including her share of marital property; additionally, upon separation, she could claim alimony. Thus, in France, the fight for women's emancipation focused on the authority of the husband on the resources of the family during the marriage and eventually lead to equal sharing of authority on marital property during the marriage and the continuous control of each spouse on their own property. In England, the married woman owned nothing and, upon separation from bed and board, could only claim alimony. Thus, in England, women's emancipation focused on ownership. This developed in a convoluted history where the first step was to allow women to own some separate property during the marriage without any claim on the husband's property upon separation to the current situation where each spouse is the sole owner of their property during the marriage, but all property is shared equally on separation or divorce with some room for the spouses to arrange otherwise in "agreements" that are not binding for the court which can decide otherwise for whatever motive it deems appropriate.

Because of these changes and others, marriage as an institutionalised form of control and maintenance for women and children, and a source of maintenance for other relatives changed deeply over a few decades. In most countries and subnational jurisdictions, the difference between legitimate and illegitimate children has been abolished so that inheritance and maintenance rights are now both based solely on filiation. The development of the welfare state transformed the role of the maintenance duty among relatives, albeit in different ways in different countries, the main sources of difference being whether state-sponsored welfare provision is universal or means-tested, and provided mainly as services or money to buy services. The United States and Sweden provide convenient examples of opposites in this matter. The United States' state-sponsored welfare is means-tested and, with the exception of healthcare for the poor, mainly provided as money or vouchers. People are expected to purchase welfare services on the market either by themselves or, especially for healthcare, through their spouse or parents. The public pension plan pays a survivor's pension to the surviving spouse, restricting this benefit to married couples. When ruling on a separation or divorce, the court must consider the cost for the state of not imposing the payment of alimony in favour of the poorest spouse. Swedish state-sponsored welfare is universal and provided mostly as .services. Private law has been amended in the early 1970s so that the maintenance duty among relatives is now limited to that of the father and mother towards their minor children. Alimony to the former spouse is restricted to blatant cases of economic dependency which are not common given that state-sponsored daycare and generous parental leave reach their goal of fostering women's economic independence. Survivor pension has been abolished: married or not, man or woman, retirement has to be funded through employment-

related contributions. On this continuum, the United Kingdom and France both lie somewhere between the two poles that are the United States and Sweden.

Other institutional factors further polarise the extremes. In the United States, private law is largely under the jurisdiction of the states. Despite attempt at standardisation rules regarding the establishment of paternity and maintenance duties vary across states and several states, regardless of a ruling of the Supreme Court, maintain some legal differences between children born to married and unmarried parents. Being married simplifies many aspects of family life (Hertz and Guillen 2017). However, rising inequality opposing low-wage work with little benefits, irregular number of hours and little to no job security, typical for low educated people, to highly paid jobs with benefits and security typical for college graduates, combined with educational homogamy, fostered the development of two contrasted patterns. Low educated women tend to prefer having their children without being married so that they can move away from a partner who cannot provide a steady income on the long term and does not provide access to health insurance, whereas college graduates tend to form dual-career couples, marry late, have their children once married and rely on the institution to know from the start how their assets will be shared if they split up (Carbone and Cahn 2014). None of this is relevant in Sweden because of high taxation, the public provision of services, the strength of trade unions and the fact that private law allows unmarried and married couples to manage their assets as they see fit. In the Swedish context, being married or living together outside of marriage is not mainly the consequence of institutional constraints, but mostly the result of a process involving a series of other factors such as ascribed and achieved characteristics or gender relations within the couple. In the United States on the contrary, the strong association between the "pattern of disadvantage" and unmarried cohabitation, and especially childbearing within unmarried cohabitation Perelli-Harris and Gerber 2010; Perelli-Harris et al. 2011) is likely a consequence of inequality in a setting that combines features inherited from common law and from the Poor Laws with a very limited and mainly means-tested social welfare provision, the restriction of some benefits to married couples, and the legal uncertainty that the variety of state provisions impose on unmarried cohabitation in a country where spatial mobility is high.

Ascribed and achieved characteristics. Endogamy and Homogamy

Kalminj (1998) provides a still valuable synthesis of the theoretical approaches to endogamy and homogamy in marriage. Endogamy is marrying with someone from the same group, while homogamy is marrying someone close in status. He groups together previous research into three

traditions. Research on ethnic and racial intermarriage, a form of endogamy, "originated in immigrant countries such as the United States and is motivated by the question of whether the various nationality groups would integrate with one another and with the original population". Research on religious intermarriage, again a form of endogamy, was "concerned with the extent to which churches control the life choices of their members and the degree to which religious involvement translates into the membership of 'communal groups' ". Research on socioeconomic homogamy "was developed by stratification researchers who used marriage patterns in conjunction with mobility patterns to describe how open stratification systems are".

Endogamy and homogamy are different in their mechanism. Endogamy is defined in relation with group membership based on ascribed characteristics, whereas homogamy is defined in relation with the individual's achieved characteristics. In some traditional societies, exogamy is used by families as a way to forge and maintain alliances across groups. In contemporary Western societies, ethnic and religious groups are mostly concerned about maintaining themselves and endogamy is a tool for the reproduction of the group: members are expected to marry someone from the group so that their offspring is a member of the group and thus perpetuates the group. This is true for ethnic groups and religious groups. In endogamy, kin typically plays a role is spouse selection. Marrying outside the group may be a step or a sign of the integration of immigrants into the larger society of the country where they live, but from the perspective of the group, it amounts to breaking the chain that allows its perpetuation. This is true *mutatis mutandis* for marrying outside the family's religious group. By marrying outside the group, one puts oneself outside of it. Unlike endogamy, homogamy is concerned with status. From the perspective of homogamy, the search for a spouse is an individual matter rather than a process that involves relatives. The individual is typically assumed to be looking for someone with similar or higher characteristics. Women looking for more educated men was a common pattern in times when higher education was the preserve of men. Looking for someone with similar education and similar or higher income is more common nowadays.

Kalmijn (1998) did not differentiate unmarried cohabitation from marriage. However (Schoen and Weinick 1993) focused on that difference and try to relate each of the two forms of union to ascribed and achieved characteristics and thus, at least indirectly, to the dynamics of endogamy and homogamy. As they put it, "[p]atterns of partner choice can illuminate the relationship between cohabitation and marriage. If cohabitations are 'informal marriages', partner choice in cohabitations should resemble partner choice in marriages. However, if cohabitation is a distinct relationship, a 'looser bond', then partner choice in cohabitations should give more emphasis to

short-term and achieved characteristics (such as education) and less emphasis to long-term and ascribed characteristics (such as age, religion, and race)." They tested this hypothesis for the United States using data from the National Survey of Families and Households and found that compared to married people, cohabitors indeed showed a greater propensity to choose a partner with similar achieved characteristics and a lesser one to choose a partner with similar ascribed characteristics.

Schoen and Weinick (1993) interpreted the opposition between ascribed and achieved characteristics as an opposition between 'short term' and 'long term' characteristics. This opposition between long and short is not as clearly defined as the difference between ascribed and achieved, but seems to imply that as ascribed characteristics have been associated with the individual since birth, they should have a long-lasting effect on the life course of the individual, while achieved characteristics, typically a recent acquisition when people are looking for a spouse or a partner for the first time, should not. This would explain the propensity to choose unmarried cohabitation rather than marriage by couples whose members have the same level of education and maybe similar jobs, but have different ethnic or religious origins, as well as the opposite propensity among couples who share origins. Although the authors did not state it clearly, the way they used the words long and short and their association of the former with ascribed characteristics and marriage, and of the latter with achieved characteristics and unmarried cohabitation seems to suggest that relations based on the similarity of achieved characteristic, or at least solely based on them, are bound to be shorter lived than relations based on ascribed ones.

Blackwell and Lichter (2004) looked at the differences between unmarried cohabitation and marriage from a different perspective. They conceptualised the three-step sequence of couple formation –dating, unmarried cohabitation and marriage– as a 'winnowing' process in which the couple either moves to the next step or breaks up depending on their match on relevant characteristics. Similarity should increase from dating to marriage and thus, on average, cohabitors should be more similar than daters, and, on average, spouses should be more similar than cohabitors. They tested their 'winnowing hypothesis' using data from the 1995 National Survey of Family Growth and found limited support for it. Blackwell and Lichter did not differentiate endogamy from homogamy –for them, similarity on any characteristic is homogamy– and did not stress the difference between ascribed and achieved characteristics. However, on close examination, their results are close to what Schoen and Weinick (1993) had found: all three types of relationships displayed a 'substantial' level of similarity, but similarity in race and religion –ascribed characteristics typical of endogamy– "increases slightly as relationships progress from dating to cohabitation to marriage".

These empirical differences between marriage and unmarried cohabitation may be envisioned from a somewhat more theoretical perspective. Unlike unmarried cohabitation, marriage is an institution and an institution whose traditional and historical function was the orderly reproduction of society as a whole and of the groups that comprise society. Traditionally and historically, groups were defined by ascribed characteristics such as ethnicity and religion. The function and meaning of marriage is not as limited to social reproduction today as it has been in the past, but the orderly reproduction of society and its groups is still a function of marriage. Hence, it should not come as a surprise that couples who have similar origins and thus share ascribed characteristics have a high propensity to be married. In concrete terms, they accept playing the role they are expected to play in the reproduction of the group they belong to. Their offspring will be part of the group and perpetuate it. Their parents will be comforted by their children forming a family and as they comply with the traditional and historical function of marriage, they are expected to get married. In their case, not getting married would be dissonant and an embarrassment for their parents, their other relatives as well as their parents' friends within the group.

Things will be different if the couple joins together individuals who do not share ascribed characteristics and thus do not belong to the same group. By living together, they reject the role each of them is expected to play in the reproduction of the group they belong to. Their offspring will not be part of any of the two groups and will not contribute to perpetuating either of them. Their parents will be disappointed by their children forming a family that breaks with the traditional and historical function of marriage. In their case, getting married would be an embarrassment for their parents, their other relatives as well as their parents' friends within the group. Living together without getting married at least saves the parents and relatives the public demonstration of a source of discomfort if not of shame, and leaves them with the hope that someday, the unmarried cohabitation will break up and their children be free to marry someone from the group. Thus, in a context where group membership is of importance –typically for people belonging to a minority within a given society–, unmarried cohabitation might be a reasonable arrangement for couples whose members distance themselves from their origins.

In some cases, unmarried cohabitation might be more than a merely reasonable arrangement, but literally the only reasonable option. In many societies, religious law is still of relevance, at least for certain religious groups. Until the second half of the 20th century, in Canada, mixed marriage meant a marriage between a Catholic and a Protestant: they were widely discouraged, and forbidden by the Catholic Church. The importance of the prescriptions of religious law on marriage has receded for most Christians living in North America, but this is not true for some other religious

groups. According to most schools of Islamic law, a Muslim man may lawfully marry a non-Muslim woman, but only if she is of a religion of the Book, that is if she is Christian or Jew. However, a Muslim woman can only lawfully marry a Muslim man. Such interfaith marriage are prohibited and invalid if they are performed; in some countries, they are deemed criminal and punishable as such. Of course, such interfaith marriages are lawful, valid and certainly not a crime in Canadian law, but believers, be they the potential spouses or their parents, may take the religious prohibition seriously. For couples transgressing the prohibition, unmarried cohabitation is the only reasonable option, as marriage would be much more than a discomfort to parents.

Thus, couples joining two individuals belonging to the same group defined by ascribed characteristics such as ethnicity and religion in a context where this group is somehow a minority in a larger society should have a high propensity to be married, whereas couples joining people with different ascribed characteristics, whether each belonging to a minority group or one belonging to such a group and the other to the majority, whatever the definition of this, should have a higher propensity to live together without being married to each other.

All this leaves aside the role of achieved characteristics in the choice between marriage and unmarried cohabitation. Again, the empirical differences may be used to provide a more encompassing vision. One finding of Blackwell and Lichter (2004) was that couples who are not similar display similar patterns of educational heterogamy, "although upward mobility through partnering is less evident among cohabitors". This amounts to say that unmarried cohabitation is more likely to join partners who have the same level of education than marriage is, while marriage is more likely to bring together spouses who have different levels of education. Typically and traditionally, wife tended to have less education than their husband, a situation that Blackwell and Lichter interpret as a form of hypergamy. The interpretation is disputable. In a context where women are less educated than men because higher education is not readily accessible for women, a woman might marry a man who is more educated than her, but is as educated as her father is: this would be pure social reproduction, not hypergamy.

Focusing on this difference in interpretation may help shed some light on the differences between education and the ascribed characteristics we have dealt with until now. Groups defined by ascribed characteristics have as long a history as their reproduction has. Education as an element of the couple formation process is something new. Compulsory education is no more than a century old, completing secondary education did not become something normal until after World War II, the expansion of tertiary education occurred in steps, but was not completed before the generations of the Baby Boom reached the age to attend university in the late 1960s, and women

did not begin to have equal access to tertiary education before the second half of the 20th century. For educational homogamy to play a significant role in couple formation, men and women must both be distributed across a hierarchical system of education levels. This prerequisite did not really exist before the second half of the 20th century. It emerged pretty much in parallel with the normalisation of the working married woman, that of the working mother and the diffusion of the two-earner model of the family, and also the spread of divorce and of unmarried cohabitation. Trying to relate these developments in a causal fashion is well beyond the scope of this article, but as education is related with income, educated women can earn an income of their own in a way that was unthinkable of before compulsory education and the generalisation of tertiary education, and these are a prerequisite for the normalisation of the working mother, the emergence of the two-earner family, and that of educational homogamy as a key element of the couple formation process. Thus, educational homogamy can only really emerge as an element of the couple formation process in a context where gender equality has become a possibility, however remote its realisation might be. As we already noticed, if women do not have access to higher education as men do, educational homogamy would have to be defined with respect to the level of education of their father and husband. In such a case, the level of education assigned to the woman would be an ascribed rather than an achieved characteristic, which would be at odds with the core of the meaning of educational homogamy.

Gender equality and economic independence

The idea that women's labour force participation and their subsequent economic independence is related to changes in family dynamics is not new. Research has especially focused on the effect of women's economic independence on union stability (see Killewald 2016 for a review). This association stems from the foundations of traditional Western marriage as a legal institution in which the economic dependence of the wife was combined with obligations imposed on the husband to provide her with the necessities of life, even after legal separation or divorce. This concept of marriage was enforced in the private law of all Western countries, but it also underpinned Becker's specialisation model: from a given set of assumptions, this model derives that the gains from marriage depend on the relative difference in the potential or actual wage rates of each spouse (Becker 1973; Becker, Landes and Michael 1977). However, as women become more educated and enter the labour force, the difference in wage rates decreases. Women can support themselves and can walk away from an unsatisfying marriage, and married couples look less and less like the asymmetrical heterogamous pair encompassed in the traditional view of marriage. The dual-earner homogamous and equalitarian couple becomes a new model of marriage

and couples in which the woman earns more than the man, far from being the norm, are not rarities any more.

The traditional view of marriage still prevails in the private law of many countries, but it is not as hegemonic as it once was. As we explained above, some jurisdictions have taken the opposite view of marriage and have amended their family law so that the institution of marriage is based on the explicit assumption that spouses are equal and independent people. This change has been made in a more systematic way in the Nordic countries more than anywhere else, especially in Sweden, where spouses may have as few mutual economic obligations as partners living in a consensual union. This was both fostered and made possible through a reform of family law and the combination of a full-employment policy, active support of women's labour force participation and policies fostering the sharing of domestic chores and parental roles that actively promotes the economic independence of the spouses (Bradley 1989; Jänterä-Jareborg et al. 2008; Sverdrup 2008). From a more general perspective, Sandström (2016) stresses that the security provided by the expansion of the Swedish welfare state made it possible to translate post-materialistic values into marriage, moving it away from the protective institution comprised of a set of economic rights and obligations between the spouses. As he points out, this role of the Nordic welfare state in these changes has been notably researched by Esping-Andersen (1999) and Lesthaeghe (2010). This logic also applies directly to the diffusion of unmarried cohabitation as a form of rights- and obligations-free conjugal union. Somehow, this seems that this has been overlooked in most research as if it were a given for researchers from the Nordic countries and irrelevant for other researchers. Despite the logical connection between unmarried cohabitation, and gender equality and economic independence, and despite the fact that the reform of family law and the development of social policies that make unmarried cohabitation a workable alternative to marriage also promote more equal gender relations, we find little if any empirical research on the relationship between equality and independence, on the one hand, and the choice of unmarried cohabitation over marriage on the other. What little research does exist seems to frame this relationship in an interpretive fashion rather than deriving and testing hypotheses.

Thus, given what we discussed so far, the relation between gender equality and spouses' economic independence, on the one hand, and the choice of unmarried cohabitation over marriage on the other may be envisioned from two different perspectives. Comparing societies, institutional settings that favour equality and independence may appear to foster the choice of unmarried cohabitation over marriage because they deprive the choice of practical consequences, whereas institutional settings that maintain or increase the consequences of the choice will clearly promote

the choice of marriage over unmarried cohabitation, at least for couples who may benefit from such differences. Comparing individuals in a given society, gender equality and spouses' economic independence thought of as achieved individual characteristics such as education and income may foster the choice of unmarried cohabitation over marriage, either as the symbol of a relationship based on equality and independence and a practical way of managing such a relationship on such terms without the intervention of the state, or, more prosaically, as to way to avoid being imposed legal protections that may become liabilities for either spouse if their wealth and income are similar.

Gender equality is closely related to homogamy, but economic independence, while related to homogamy and especially to income homogamy, is something different. As Carbone and Cahn (2014) illustrate it using the example of a couple in which the woman is a US judge and the husband a corporate lawyer, spouses may be potentially economically independent to the point that each could provide for their children on their own income alone, despite the one's income being a fraction of the other's.

Previous research on marriage and unmarried cohabitation in Canada

Anecdotal evidence suggested that by the end of the 1970s, unmarried cohabitation was no more an isolated phenomenon in Canada. In the 1981 Census, Statistics Canada attempted to enumerate unmarried partners by instructing them to answer the question on the relation to the head of the household as if they were a husband or wife. Spouses were to be distinguished from unmarried partners using marital status. Given that, at any time, some unmarried partners are still married to their 'former' spouse, this strategy led to the misclassification of such individuals and the underestimation of unmarried partners (Dumas and Bélanger 1997). The 1986 Census used the same strategy, but since 1991, the census form uses different categories for spouses and unmarried partners in the question on the relation to the head of the household, as well as a direct question on living or not in a common-law union –the vernacular name of unmarried cohabitation in English-speaking Canada– separate from the question on marital status.

Some of the research published in the 1990s –such as Dumas and Péron (1992), Balakrishnan, Lapierre-Adamcyk and Krotki (1993) and Dumas and Bélanger (1997)– focused on documenting the rise of unmarried cohabitation. The main finding was that 'living common-law' was more widespread in Quebec than in the rest of Canada. Others looked more specifically at the relation between living in a common-law union and sociodemographic characteristics (Turcotte and Bélanger 1997; Turcotte and Golscheider 1998; Bélanger and Turcotte 1999). Kerr, Moyser and Beaujot (2006) conducted the most recent study of this type, which confirmed what had emerged

over the previous decade or so: unmarried cohabitation is associated with lower social status in English-speaking provinces, but not in Quebec.

Given these results, it is no surprise that Quebec demographers got interested in the 'meaning of cohabitation'. Early research investigated whether unmarried cohabitation was a prelude to marriage or an alternative to marriage, without providing a definitive answer (Lapierre-Adamcyk, Balakrishnan and Krotki 1987; Lapierre-Adamcyk 1989). Several years later, it had become clear that, at least in Quebec, *unmarried* cohabitation was not just *premarital* cohabitation (Le Bourdais and Marcil-Gratton 1996; Le Bourdais and Neill 1998; Le Bourdais, Neill and Turcotte 2000; Le Bourdais and Lapierre-Adamcyk 2004). Comparative research showed that unmarried couples stayed together longer in Quebec than in Ontario, and were less prone to marry (Le Bourdais and Marcil-Gratton 1996; Lapierre-Adamcyk, Le Bourdais and Marcil-Gratton 1999). Comparative research also showed differences in values. In Quebec, young people favoured values pointing towards a redefinition of the conjugal union: compared to young people from Ontario, they gave less importance to a stable couple relationship, less importance to marriage as a source of happiness, and more importance to work (Lapierre-Adamcyk, Le Bourdais and Marcil-Gratton 1999). Péron (2003) summed up this line of research in the title of a book chapter he wrote on nuptiality in Quebec, stating that from the beginning to the end of the 20th century, marriage went from being a necessity to being an option. Lachapelle (2007) added one important nuance to this synthesis: unmarried cohabitation is not more common in Quebec than in the rest of Canada, it is more common among French-speaking Quebeckers than among other Canadians.

More recent research takes unmarried cohabitation as a given. Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard (2009) find little differences in the quality of the relationship between unmarried partners and spouses in Quebec. Laplante and Flick (2010) found that in Ontario, reported measures of health were significantly lower among unmarried partners than among spouses, but found little differences between the two groups in Quebec. Lardoux and Pelletier (2012) found that, in Quebec, having unmarried parents has no negative effect on educational outcomes for boys, and a *positive* outcome for girls.

Much of the research on unmarried cohabitation in Canada has focused on Quebec. Quebec demographers know the American literature and cite it, but they also know the French literature and it is no surprise that, on this topic, they seem to find more similarities between Quebec and France than between Quebec and the USA. The article by Villeneuve-Gokalp (1990), in which the diffusion of unmarried cohabitation in France in the1980s is documented, is widely cited by them. More recently, studies on the use, by opposite-sex couples, of PACS, –a form of 'dependence free'

registered partnership originally designed for same-sex couples– has attracted some interest for its practical similarity with common-law union (on PACS, see Rault 2009).

Some of the research on unmarried cohabitation in Canada as a whole has been done with an eye on the American experience. From this perspective, unmarried cohabitation is considered something that delays marriage, or a step in the formation of a new marriage after divorce. Pollard and Wu (1998), Wu (1995, 1996, 1999) are typical examples of this approach, in which 'cohabitation' in Canada appears to be similar to 'cohabitation' in the USA, once admitted that things are different in Quebec.

The current dominant view is that in Quebec, or more precisely among French-speaking Quebeckers, living in a consensual union is as normal or mainstream as it is in France or in the Nordic countries, whereas outside Quebec and among non-French-speaking Quebeckers, it is either a convenient transient state for young adults or an alternative form of marriage for the poor, pretty much as it is held to be in the USA. These results add to the common perception that, in other Canadian provinces, common-law unions have the same meaning as in the United States, where research shows that they remain either a transient state from which couples get out rapidly by splitting or marrying, or a form of cheap alternative to marriage onto which poor people rely (Fry 2010, Hill 2009, Phillips and Sweeney 2005, Oppenheimer 2003, Oppenheimer, Kalmijn and Lim 1997, Manning and Smock 1995). In Canada, Kerr, Moyser and Beaujot (2006) showed that outside Quebec, common-law partners are clearly less educated and less wealthy than married spouses. Still outside of Quebec, unmarried couples with young children are mostly young and disadvantaged (Stalker and Ornstein 2013).

Laplante and Fostik (2017) examined factors related to the probability of living in a common-law relationship among French-speaking Quebeckers and English-speaking Ontarians. They found that among French-speaking Quebeckers, living in common-law relationships is widespread and the probability of doing so varies according to age, but depends very little on the level of education, whereas the share of the woman's income in the couple's income has a qualified effect: in does not always significantly increase the probability of living in common-law relationship, but it never significantly decrease it. Among English-speaking Ontarians, living in a common-law relationship after age 30 varies initially in inverse proportion to the level of education whereas the effect of the share of the woman's income in the couple's income has the same pattern as among French-speaking Quebeckers.

OBJECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES

We are interested in the effect of a series of factors that are likely to increase or decrease the probability for a couple to be married or to live in a consensual union. We know that the effect of these factors, if they truly exist, modify the overall probability of married or to live in a consensual union in the institutional context where couples live. As explained above, previous research, some contexts, such as those that prevail in many European countries, make living together without being married relatively easy, while other contexts, such as that of the United States, make it more difficult. Technically speaking, in order to estimate the effect of the other factors we are mainly interested in, they must be estimated net of the baseline probability of living in a consensual union or not. The model we use and introduce below allows this.

As we state in the introduction, our general hypotheses are that as a rule, characteristics that make the couple close to what may be taken as the norm increase the probability of being married whereas characteristics that strengthen the economic position of the woman in the couple increase the probability of living in a consensual union.

We limit the analysis to different-sex couples in which the woman is in her reproductive years and the man has an income. We are chiefly interested in family formation, and particularly aware of the differences between couples where the woman is in her reproductive years and those where neither partner has to face the constraints induced by the presence of current or potential children. Being married or living in a consensual union later in the life course, couples in which the man has no income and same-sex couples are all different topics that require further investigation, and so are not addressed in this study.

Age and Education of the Woman. Institutional context

The probability of living together outside of marriage is known to decrease with age and to vary across education levels. Previous research showed that the effect of these two characteristics are intertwined and are best modelled together. Failure to do so might impair the estimation of the effects of the other variable we are interested in. Approximating the effect of age using a curvilinear relationship and estimating this relationship separately by level of education has proven useful and we do so here. Each curve may be interpreted as a baseline probability function whose shape and location may be modified by the effects of the other independent variables. We expect differences between Quebec and the Rest of Canada.

Difference by institutional context

Ascribed and Achieved Characteristics. Similarity and difference

As a rule, we expect similarity to increase the probability of being married and dissimilarity to reduce it. Thus, sharing the same religious attribute should decrease the probability of living in a consensual union, while having different religious attributes should increase it. Couples in which the woman and the man are born in the same foreign country as well as couples in which both speak the same language should be more likely to be married than those who do not share these characteristics.

Having approximately the same age should decrease the probability of living in a consensual union. Conversely, the larger the age difference between the man and the woman, the higher should be the probability they live in a consensual union.

Citizenship is a somewhat different case. We expect couples in which at least one the partners has a foreign citizenship to be less prone to live in a consensual union because of the principle of private international law by which countries usually recognise marriage solemnised in other countries and for which there is no equivalent for consensual union. Being married secures the rights of the couple in the country of which they are a citizen and may allow granting its citizenship to the other spouse, something that is not always possible for those who live in a consensual union.

Within Couple Gender Relations as Forms of Homogamy and Heterogamy

We are interested in three aspects of within-couple homogamy: economic homogamy —whether or not both the man and the woman are in the labour force—, educational homogamy and income homogamy. These three measures are not independent of each other and so we model them accordingly.

We measure-income homogamy within the couple using the share of the woman's income in the total income of the couple. *Cæteris paribus*, the probability of living in a consensual union rather than being married should increase with the share of the woman's income in the couple's income.

However, things might not be that simple. The effect of within-couple income homogamy may vary according to the educational structure of the couple. Income and education are two components or markers of the position of the individual in the social structure, and while they are usually correlated, they are not the same. Income homogamy might very well have a different meaning and a different effect for a couple where the two partners have the same level of education, compared to a couple where the woman has more education than her partner or a couple where the man has more education than his partner. In other words, the effect of the share of the

woman's income in the couple's income may vary according to the level of education of each of the partners. Thus, we estimate the effect of the share of the woman's income in the couple's income for every combination of each partner's level of education. In other words, we model the effect of income homogamy, or lack thereof, as conditional on educational homogamy or lack thereof.

The educational structure of the couple comprises two different pieces of information: the level of education and the homogamy or heterogamy. *Cæteris paribus*, among couples in which both partners have the same level of education, we expect the probability of living in a consensual union to decrease as the level of education increases. Among couples in which both partners do not have the same level of education, we expect the probability of living in a consensual union to be greater among couples in which the woman is more educated than the man. The effect of this variable is assessed by comparing the results from different equations.

There is economic equality in the couple if both spouses or partners are economically independent; we operationalise this as earning a market income that, at least in theory, allows them to care for themselves and for any children they might have. Economic equality is measured through the labour force participation of the woman. Participation in the labour force is a binary measurement: women are either in or out of the labour force. We do not use this measurement as an independent variable because it defines two qualitatively different situations. Rather, we estimate separate equations for couples in which the woman is in the labour force and couples in which she is not. Again, the effect of this variable is assessed by comparing the results from different equations. By definition, women out of the labour force are economically dependent on their partner's income and benefit from marriage as a protective institution. *Cæteris paribus*, we expect couples of a given educational structure to be less likely to live in a consensual union if the woman is in the labour force. Understandably, economic equality is defined only for couples in which the woman is in the labour force and gets an income from paid work.

Social Protection

The position of the woman in the couple depends of the characteristics of the couple, but also on some characteristics specific to the woman. From the perspective of private law, marriage is a system of provision of protection: the less favoured spouse is entitled to the benefits that come with the income and wealth of the more favoured. Unlike self-employment, employment usually provides a series of benefits such as complementary health insurance, unemployment insurance, some form of retirement plan, etc. that can be viewed as an individual substitute to the protection

provided by marriage. Women who benefit from such form of social protection might be more prone to live in a consensual union.

Other Factors to Be Controlled

Income is a social indicator related to but nonetheless different from education. Although there is not as much research on income as a factor of unmarried cohabitation as there is on education, the probability of living together without being married is expected to decrease as income level increases. We expect similar results.

Previous research indicates that the probability of living in a consensual union rather than being married varies depending on the presence of children. Owning rather than renting the family home should also be related to this probability, since becoming a homeowner is an important step in the family formation process. Accordingly, homeowners should have a higher probability of being married than living in a consensual union. The inclusion of these characteristics in our equations allows us to estimate the effects of our measures of within-couple equality, net of the effects of other well-known predictors of union type.

We expect ownership of the home and the presence of children to decrease the probability of living in a consensual union. These effects should be weaker in Quebec than elsewhere in Canada.

DATA AND MODEL

Data

We use microdata from the three censuses of Canada conducted by Statistics Canada in 1991, 2001 and 2011. We limit our analyses to couples where the woman was aged between 15 and 49 years old at the time of the census, and where the man was in the labour force and reported having an income.

Model

We extend a model first proposed by Laplante and Fostik (2017) and use logistic regression to estimate the effect of a series of characteristics on the probability of living in a consensual union rather than being married among women aged between 15 and 49 years old who live in a conjugal relationship. We estimate one equation for each census. Because the share of the woman's income in the couple's income is defined only for couples where the woman is in the labour force, we estimate different equations for couples where the woman is in the labour force and those where she is not. We thus estimate 12 equations.

The equation we estimate may be written as follows,

$$\ln\left(\frac{\pi}{1-\pi}\right) = \sum_{i=1}^{4}\left(\alpha_{i1}W_i + \alpha_{i2}W_iA + \alpha_{i3}W_iA^2\right) + \sum_{i=1}^{4}\sum_{j=1}^{4}\beta_{1ij}W_iM_jS + \sum_{i=1}^{4}\sum_{j=1}^{4}\beta_{2ij}W_iM_jI + \sum_{i=1}^{k}\gamma_iX_i,$$

where π is the probability of living in a consensual union rather than being married for a woman; W_i stands for a series of binary variables representing the education level of the woman; A is the age of the woman; a_{1i}, a_{2i} and a_{3i} are the three parameters of the curvilinear relationship between the age of the woman and the probability of living in a consensual union rather than being married for women having level of education i; M_j stands for a series of binary variables representing the education level of the man; S is the share of the woman's income in the total income of the couple; β_{1ij}, is the effect of the share of the woman's income in the total income of the couple on the probability of living in a consensual union for women who have education level i and whose partners have level of education j; I is the logarithm of the income of the couple; β_{2ij} is the effect of the logarithm of the income of the couple for women who have education level i and whose partners have level of education j; X represents variables where the effect is linear and unconditional; and γ stands for the effects of each of these variables.

The curvilinear relationship is parametrised using the degree of freedom ordinarily used for the intercept. In this equation, the curvilinear relationship between age and the probability of living in a consensual union rather than being married is akin to the baseline hazard function in a hazard model; estimating it separately for four different levels of education makes the equation akin to a stratified hazard model. The term of the equation that estimates the variation of the probability of living in a consensual union as a function of the share of the woman's income in the couple's income according to the level of education of both partners —$\beta_{ij}W_iM_jS$— also allows the estimates of the variation of this probability as a function of the age of the woman according to the level of education of each partner. In the equations where the woman is out of the labour force, this term is replaced with the level of education of her partner.

RESULTS

Changes in population composition over time

Table 1 provide a description of the samples of couples in which the woman is in the labour force in Quebec and in Canada outside Quebec for each of the tree censuses were using. Table 2 provides the same for the samples in which he woman is in the labour force. Taken together, these tables bring to light the differences between the two regions and the changes in the composition of the population over time.

The distribution of the dependent variables is very different in Quebec and in the Rest of Canada. Among the couples in which the woman is in the labour force, the proportion of couples living in a consensual union increased markedly from the first to the last census in both regions, but the magnitudes are different: in 2011, less than one in five couples was living in a consensual union outside Quebec, while more than half of the couples did so in Quebec. The regional trends are the same among couples in which the woman is not in the labour force, but the proportions are lower, more so in Quebec. Marriage is by far the dominant form of conjugal union outside Quebec, whether the woman is in the labour force or not. In Quebec, marriage is the main form of conjugal union for couples in which the woman is not in the labour force, whereas consensual union is the main form for couples in which she is in the labour force.

From the fist to the last census, the distribution of educational level has shifted upwards for women and for men in both regions and among all couples. The proportion of university-educated people is always lower in Quebec than in the Rest of Canada. This is a well-known fact explained partly by the development of technical training at the non-university post-secondary level, larger in Quebec that in the Rest of Canada, and by immigration: Canada has long had a policy of selecting highly educated immigrants and the proportion of foreign-born people is lower in Quebec than in the Rest of Canada (see Laplante et al. 2016). That said, the most relevant figures are the proportion of university-educated women and men in the two groups couples. Among couples where the woman is in the labour force, from the first to the last census, in both regions, the proportion of university-educated women went from lower than that of men to higher than that of men. Among couples where the woman is not in the labour force, the proportion of university-educated women increased, but remained lower than that of men.

In both regions, from the first to the last census, the modal category of the share of the woman's income in the couple's income moved upwards, from between 20% and 40% to between

40% and 60%. Outside Quebec, in 2011, the woman's share was at least 40% in 53.3% of couples; this proportion was 58.8% in Quebec.

From the first census to the last, in the Rest of Canada, the proportion of couples made of two Canadian-born people decrease somewhat among couples in which the woman is in the labour force, but more markedly among couples where she is not. In Quebec, this proportion is lower, obviously, but increases in both groups of couples. In the first case, the change is a consequence of immigration; in the second case, it is a consequence of internal migration in Quebec, The proportion of couples made of two French-speaking people born in Quebec decrease slightly among couples in which the woman is in the labour force, but much more among couples in which she is not in the labour force. Outside Quebec, the proportion of couples made of two people born abroad in the same country increases within both forms of couples, and is larger among couples in which the woman is not in the labour force than in couples in which she is. This is true in Quebec too, but the difference in the magnitudes is striking: in 2011, 9.5% of couples were made of two people born abroad in the same country among couple in which the woman is in the labour force, but this proportion was 23.3% among couples in which she is not. Couples in which the woman is not in the labour force are more closely linked to immigration in Quebec than in the Rest of Canada.

Among couples in which the woman is in the labour force, the proportion of couples in which neither the woman nor the man has a foreign citizenship decreased in both regions. This proportion is higher in Quebec than in the Rest of Canada in all censuses. The pattern and the trend are the same among couples in which the woman is not in the labour force, but the proportions are always lower in this group than in the other, in both regions and in all censuses. Across censuses, the proportion of couples in which both the man and the woman are citizens of a foreign country increases in both regions and in both forms of couples. Here again, couples in which the woman is not in the labour force are linked to immigration.

In all censuses, in both regions and whether the woman is ion the labour force or not, most couples share the same religion, most couples share the same religion. However, there are differences. From the first to the last census, this proportion decreases in Quebec, but decreases in the Rest of Canada. The changes are small, but the two trends are clear.

From the first census to the last, in the Rest of Canada, the proportion of couples made of two native English-speaking people decrease somewhat among the couples in which the woman is in the labour force, but more markedly among those in which the woman is not in the labour force.

The trend is the same in Quebec for French-speaking people. This pattern is similar to that of the origin. In both regions, the proportion of couples who share the same foreign language increases. The proportion of couples in which both people speak different non-official languages remains small.

The distribution of the age difference between the woman and the man is fairly stable and the most common case is the one in which the woman is one or two years younger than the man. The only trend is a slight increase in the proportion of couples in which the woman is one or two years older than the man among the couples in which the woman is in the labour force. The increase is larger in the Rest of Canada than in Quebec.

The distribution of the class or worker of the woman is fairly stable too: most women in the labour force are employed rather than self-employed and, among the latter, few are incorporated.

Analyses

Figures 1 to 4 report the predicted probability of living in a consensual union rather than being married according to the age of the woman in Quebec and in Canada outside Quebec for couples where the woman is in the labour force and couples in which she is not in the labour force. Probabilities are predicted by the educational structure of the couple, that is by combinations of the educational level of the woman and of the man. The upper panes of each figure display the probabilities for couples in which the woman and the man have the same level of education. The lower panes display the probabilities for a selection of combination of different educational levels. Probabilities are predicted for each census. For brevity, couples in which the woman is in the labour force are said to be economically homogamous; among these, couples in which the woman and the man have the same educational level are educationally homogamous, while those in which they have different educational levels are educationally heterogamous.

Figure 1 shows that in Canada outside Quebec, living in a consensual union was typical of people aged less than thirty already in 1991 and remained so in 2011, although it had become more common in 2001 and almost universal in 2011 among the very young. The upper panes show that there is little variation with this respect across educational levels. The main difference being that young couples of highly educated people were less prone than others to live in 1991, but are as much likely to do so in 2011, the difference being then visible among couples in which the woman is aged at least 25. The overall pattern among educationally heterogamous couples in the same as among homogamous ones.

Figure 2 shows that unlike in the Rest of Canada where the pattern of the relationship between age and educational levels remains similar across censuses despite a small upwards right, the corresponding pattern changed significantly in Quebec. Among educationally homogamous couples, the probability of living in a consensual union decreases with age in all censuses, but the levels are always higher in Quebec and the decrease is almost linear. The curves are close to each other in 1991 and 2001, but not in 2011 where they stand apart without being ordered according to the educational level; that said, couples of highly educated people are the less prone to live in a consensual union. The overall pattern is the same among the educationally heterogamous couples, but the differences are larger. In 2011, where the differences are the largest, couples in which the man has a higher educational level than the woman are more likely to be married than couples in which the woman has a higher level than the man. Couples in which either the woman or the man has less than secondary and the other one has non-university post-secondary level are the more likely to live in a consensual union. That said, in all censuses, all economically homogamous couples are much more likely to live in consensual union in Quebec that in the Rest of Canada.

The upper part of Figure 3 shows that a in Canada without Quebec, in couples where the woman in not in the labour force, among couples in which the woman and the man have the same educational level, the pattern of the relationship between the age of the woman and the probability of living in a consensual union among economically heterogamous couples is similar to that of the economically homogamous couples, but with a noticeable difference: the curves are further apart and are ordered according to the educational level. The lower part of the figure shows that the basic pattern is similar among educationally heterogamous couples, with a distinct pattern for couples in which the woman has a university education and the man has not completed secondary education. The couples are more prone than others to live in a consensual union among the young, but less than most others among the older.

The three panes of Figure 4 could best be described as falling between the corresponding panes of Figures 2 and 3. The probability of living in a consensual union among Quebec educationally homogenous and economically heterogamous couples is higher than in the Rest of Canada, but the shape of the curves and how they are set apart from each other are similar to what is seen in the Rest of Canada than among the Quebec economically homogamous couples, with one important difference: in 2011, as in the corresponding pane of Figure 2, the curves are not ordered according to educational levels. As in Figure 2, still in 2011, among the educationally heterogamous, couples in which the man has a higher educational level than the woman are more likely to be married than couples in which the woman has a higher level than the man.

Table 3 and 4 report the estimates of the models, the first one for couples in which the woman is in the labour force and the second one, for couples in which she is not.

Among those in which the woman is in the labour force, couples in which either one or both partners are native French-speaking Quebeckers are the most likely to live in a consensual union; this is true in all censuses and whether they live in Quebec or elsewhere in Canada. Couples who share a mother tongue that is neither English nor French are the least likely to live in a consensual union, in all censuses and everywhere in Canada.

In all censuses and everywhere in Canada, couples who share the same religion are less likely to live in a consensual union than those who do not.

In all censuses and everywhere in Canada couples in which at least one partner is a citizen of a foreign country are less likely to live in a consensual union than couples in which neither partner is citizen of a foreign country.

The pattern of the effect of the age difference between the woman and the man is the same in both regions and the trend in this effect is the same in both regions. Couples in which the woman is one or two years younger than the man are the less likely to live in a consensual union. The probability of living in a consensual union increases as the age difference between the two increases. However, from the first to the last census, the size of the effects decreases.

In all censuses and in both regions employed women are more likely to live in a consensual union that self-employed women, whether incorporated or not.

In all censuses and in both regions, the point estimate of the coefficient of the share of the woman's income in the couple's income is larger than one for all combinations of levels of education. It is statistically significant for most combinations in 1991 and 2001, both in Quebec and in the rest of Canada. It is not statistically significant for most combinations in 2011. In Quebec, it is significant for couples where the woman has either completed secondary education or non-university postsecondary. In Quebec and in the rest of Canada, it is significant for couples in which both partners have a university education.

Outside Quebec, in all censuses, the point estimate of the coefficient of the logarithm of the couple's income is smaller than one for all combinations of level of education and statistically significant in all but one. In Quebec, this coefficient is not statistically significant, except in three cases: in 20011 for couples in which the woman has non-university post-secondary education and

the man university education, and in 2001 and 2011, for couples in which both have university education.

In all censuses, owning the home reduces the probability of living in a consensual union, the effect being smaller in Quebec than in the rest of Canada.

In all censuses and both, having children reduces the probability of living in a consensual union. The effect is smaller in Quebec than elsewhere in Canada for children less than 18 years old.

Barring that some variables are not defined for couples in which the woman is not in the labour force –the share of the woman's income in the couple's income and the class of worker of the woman–, the results for these coupes are similar to those of the couples in which the woman is in the labour force. There are only two noteworthy differences.

In 1991 and 2001, in Canada outside Quebec, couples in which the man is a citizen of a foreign country are not less prone to live in a consensual union than couples in which neither of the partners is ca itizen of a foreign country, whereas couples in which the woman or both partners are citizen of a foreign country are, as they are among the couples in which the woman is in the labour force.

Most coefficients of the logarithm of the couple's income are statistically significant in Quebec in 1991, and the number of such coefficients that remain statistically significant decrease in the two following censuses. In 2011, only five coefficients are statistically significant and four of them are for couples in which the woman did not complete secondary education.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The choice between being married or living together as an unmarried couples or, more descriptively, being in one state rather than the other, is commonly envisioned or studied from either one of two opposite perspectives each rooted in a different institutional context. In the American perspective, embodied in a tradition that goes from Oppenheimer to Perelli-Harris, living together without being married and especially having children while living in an unmarried cohabiting relationship is foremost a consequence of deprivation. In the European perspective, exemplified by the Second Demographic Transition Theory, living in an unmarried cohabiting relationship with or without children is a by-product of a transformation of society in which individuals are free to organise their private life outside of the interference of the State. In this paper, we argue first that each of the two perspectives takes its full meaning in the social, economic and political context in which it was developed and, second, that in either context, living a married

or an unmarried couple is the product of a multifactor process that is not reducible to the encompassing unidimensional macrosocial structural difference assumed by each of the two perspectives. Several other factors could be considered and among them, we focused on three that are known to play a role in couple formation and dynamics: endogamy and exogamy, homogamy and heterogamy, and, finally, the economic component of within-couple gender relations. Our general hypotheses were that as a rule, characteristics that make the couple close to what may be taken as the norm increase the probability of being married whereas characteristics that strengthen the economic position of the woman in the couple increase the probability of living in a consensual union. Our results are close to our hypotheses and the departures provide new insights on some aspects of the process.

The most salient feature of our results is the profound difference in the relationship between the age of the woman, educational levels and the probability of living in a consensual union between Quebec and the rest of Canada. Consensual union has been known to be much more common in Quebec than in the rest of Canada for some time, but the difference in the age by education pattern and their evolution over time is still understudied. Quebec's pattern as it exists among couples who share the same educational level is close that what could be found in a Nordic country, whereas the corresponding pattern of the rest of Canada is close to what could be expected in the United States. In Quebec, the probability of living in a consensual union is high at all age and common among all educational levels despite the fact that it decreases with the age of the woman and as the educational level increases. Elsewhere in Canada, the probability of living in a consensual union decreases rapidly with age and is a rarity after age 30, and the differences between the curves of the educational levels are larger than in Quebec. As we explain above, in Quebec, the shift towards a Northern-like pattern can likely be attributed partly to a shift towards Nordic-style social policies that make individuals less dependent on their kin than in the rest of North America, and partly to a completely opposite and contradictory move in private law that increased the economic dependence within married couples and pushed individualistic couples away from marriage.

Couples whose characteristics place them close to the norm that is likely to prevail in their own context are more likely to be married than those whose characteristics set them apart from that norm. Couples who share the same religion, couples born in the same foreign country, couples who speak the same non-official language are the most likely to be married. By sharing such characteristics and being married, these couples contribute to the reproduction of the religious, linguistic or ethnic group to which they both belong, through their potential offspring, but also

through by abiding by the rules or customs of their group on the proper way to form a family which invariably include formal marriage. Conversely, consensual union offers an alternative to couples who do not share these characteristics.

Interestingly, the age difference between the woman and the man has a strong effect that acts in a similar way as endogamous characteristics despite having nothing to do with the reproduction of social groups. Sample descriptions show that the most common form of couple joins a woman to a man one or two years older than her, and that the distribution of the age difference follows a normal distribution centred on the modal category. Interestingly, the estimates of the effect of the age difference between the woman and the man on the probability of living in a consensual union show a pattern in which the probability in which the probability of living in a consensual union increases as the absolute value of the age difference increases. In other words, the social norm about the proper age difference in a couple acts by imposing a shape on the distribution of couples, but also by imposing a similar shape on the distribution of consensual union —or marriage— within the distribution of couples.

As we expected, foreign citizenship increases the probability of being married and this his effect is net of those of endogamic characteristics. As we suggested, this is likely a consequence of a principle of private international law by which countries usually recognise marriage solemnised in other countries and for which there is no equivalent for consensual union. Being married secures the rights of the couple in the country of which they are a citizen and may allow granting its citizenship to the other spouse, something that is not always possible for those who live in a consensual union.

As we explain above, the difference in the probability of being married or living in a consensual union between Quebec and the rest of Canada is primarily a matter of institutional differences. However, the institutional differences do not explain all the variation in the probability. In the Rest of Canada as well as within Quebec, being born in Quebec and speaking French increase the probability of living in a consensual union. These effects are strong: they are significant when comparing the Quebec-born native French-speaking to native English-speaking people born elsewhere in Canada, but also comparing languages spoken at the time of the census. This means that somehow, the political views or the social norms that have led the National Assembly to pass the laws that favoured the rise in consensual union shape the choices of French-speaking Quebeckers who moved to other parts of Canada, but also that non–French-speaking people who live in Quebec act, at least in part, according to the views and norms that prevails elsewhere in Canada. In other words, people internalise the norms and views on these matters that were

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prevailing where they were socialised and act according to them even when the institutional context embodies different views and norms.

The effect of within-couple gender economic variables is revealing. The probability of living in a consensual union increases with the share of the woman's income, but this effect has been decreasing over time. In 1991, it was significant in almost all couples, whatever the combination of educational levels, while in 2011, it is found mainly in couples where the woman as a secondary or a non-university post-secondary education. It remains significant also among couples in which both the woman and the man have a university education. There is no obvious substantive reason for the waning of this effect. If the waning was limited to Quebec, one might suspect that by becoming as common as it is among couples in which the woman is in the labour force, this factor might have lost its specific effect. However, this waning is not limited to Quebec. One possible explanation would be that the decrease in the effect might be related to a change in the composition of the population: the share of the woman's income in the couple's income has increased over time and the distribution of educational level has shifted upwards. Still, more work remains to be done.

As expected, employed women are more prone to live in a consensual union than self-employed women, whether incorporated or not. Women who get a regular income and who benefit from the social protection that typically comes with employment act as if they felt free to avoid the private form protection that comes with marriage.

Over the last decades, the rise in the number and proportion of couples living together without being married in most Western countries has fostered studies that have been merely focused on a theoretical debate that opposes two perspectives each rooted in a specific institutional context very different from the institutional context in which the other perspective is rooted. Our study shows that despite these perspectives being irreconcilable as the institutional context in which they are rooted are grounded in almost antagonistic legal systems and political experiences, it is possible to approach the choice between marriage and consensual union as a more complex process that involves other meaningful factors.

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Table 1. Samples description. Proportions. Couples in which the woman is in the labour force. 1991, 2001 and 2011 censuses. Data from the 20% samples that completed the long-form. Weighted estimation.

	Canada without Quebec			Quebec		
	1991	2001	2011	1991	2001	2011
Type of union						
Marriage	0.894	0.853	0.812	0.728	0.572	0.447
Consensual union	0.106	0.147	0.188	0.272	0.428	0.553
Woman's age						
15 to 19	0.072	0.050	0.046	0.086	0.066	0.060
20 to 24	0.178	0.125	0.132	0.186	0.132	0.149
25 to 29	0.211	0.175	0.175	0.215	0.167	0.196
30 to 34	0.209	0.221	0.195	0.200	0.214	0.187
35 to 39	0.192	0.228	0.214	0.179	0.229	0.190
40 to 44	0.138	0.200	0.237	0.134	0.191	0.217
Level of education of the woman						
Less than secondary	0.236	0.159	0.058	0.219	0.138	0.064
Secondary	0.285	0.251	0.208	0.293	0.256	0.146
Non-university postsecondary	0.303	0.342	0.330	0.315	0.355	0.411
University	0.176	0.248	0.403	0.174	0.250	0.379
Level of education of the man						
Less than secondary	0.265	0.195	0.091	0.257	0.195	0.108
Secondary	0.214	0.219	0.229	0.230	0.232	0.156
Non-university postsecondary	0.329	0.356	0.352	0.317	0.345	0.443
University	0.192	0.230	0.328	0.196	0.229	0.293
Birth						
Both FS born in Quebec	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.752	0.740	0.681
One FS born in Quebec	0.016	0.015	0.013	0.105	0.111	0.121
Both born in Canada outside QC	0.685	0.682	0.646	0.051	0.054	0.057
Born in different countries	0.168	0.159	0.157	0.036	0.037	0.046
Born in the same country	0.128	0.142	0.182	0.056	0.058	0.095
First language						
Both English	0.699	0.681	0.648	0.044	0.036	0.033
Both French	0.030	0.025	0.021	0.804	0.797	0.750
One English and one French	0.041	0.038	0.032	0.047	0.045	0.043
Both the same other language	0.115	0.141	0.186	0.055	0.064	0.103
Different other languages	0.013	0.015	0.024	0.005	0.008	0.016
Other combination	0.103	0.099	0.089	0.045	0.051	0.056
Religion						
Different	0.333	0.340	0.299	0.062	0.070	0.096
The same	0.667	0.660	0.701	0.938	0.930	0.904
Foreign citizenship						
Neither	0.874	0.872	0.852	0.947	0.936	0.895
The man	0.031	0.033	0.035	0.016	0.019	0.025
The woman	0.037	0.039	0.041	0.013	0.017	0.024
Both	0.057	0.056	0.072	0.023	0.028	0.057

Table 1. Samples description. Proportions. Couples in which the woman is in the labour force. 1991, 2001 and 2011 censuses. Data from the 20% samples that completed the long-form. Weighted estimation. (Continued)

	Canada without Quebec			Quebec		
	1991	2001	2011	1991	2001	2011
Age difference between the woman and the man						
Woman at least 3 years older	0.062	0.075	0.070	0.066	0.079	0.071
Woman 1 or 2 years older	0.098	0.107	0.114	0.103	0.107	0.108
Same age	0.112	0.113	0.122	0.112	0.109	0.112
Woman 1 or 2 years younger	0.275	0.259	0.255	0.278	0.257	0.247
Woman 3 or 4 years younger	0.203	0.190	0.181	0.202	0.191	0.186
Woman 5 to 7 years younger	0.147	0.147	0.147	0.141	0.147	0.154
Woman at least 8 years younger	0.103	0.109	0.111	0.097	0.111	0.123
Share of the woman's income in the couple's income						
From 0% to less than 20%	0.208	0.191	0.176	0.184	0.164	0.137
From 20% to less than 40%	0.364	0.333	0.314	0.380	0.347	0.333
From 40% to less than 60%	0.333	0.352	0.345	0.344	0.367	0.377
From 60% to less than 80%	0.065	0.084	0.109	0.066	0.084	0.106
From 80% to 100%	0.030	0.040	0.056	0.027	0.038	0.048
Class of worker of the woman						
Employed	0.910	0.885	0.903	0.916	0.899	0.906
Incorporated self-employed	0.021	0.026	0.024	0.022	0.025	0.022
Other self-employed	0.048	0.070	0.053	0.037	0.056	0.054
Unpaid family worker	0.007	0.007	0.004	0.007	0.004	0.003
Not applicable	0.014	0.012	0.016	0.019	0.016	0.015
Owning the home						
No	0.240	0.202	0.180	0.286	0.252	0.223
Yes	0.760	0.798	0.820	0.714	0.748	0.777
Presence of children of different age groups (logical variables)						
0 to 5 years old	0.287	0.265	0.291	0.274	0.260	0.320
6 to 14 years old	0.399	0.414	0.389	0.382	0.392	0.364
15 to 17 years old	0.169	0.182	0.167	0.152	0.161	0.154
18 to 24 years old	0.162	0.172	0.155	0.135	0.163	0.149
Average income of the woman	20,349	27,906	40,661	19,263	26,108	36,822
Average income of the man	36,240	45,624	60,954	33,359	41,072	52,867
Average income of the couple	56,589	73,530	101,615	52,623	67,180	89,689
Number of women	476,245	479,520	472,655	154,010	149,025	162,595

Table 2. Samples description. Proportions. Couples in which the woman is not in the labour force. 1991, 2001 and 2011 censuses. Data from the 20% samples that completed the long-form. Weighted estimation.

	Canada without Quebec			Quebec		
	1991	2001	2011	1991	2001	2011
Type of union						
Marriage	0.933	0.887	0.850	0.863	0.678	0.587
Consensual union	0.067	0.113	0.150	0.137	0.322	0.413
Woman's age						
15 to 19	0.071	0.064	0.063	0.059	0.070	0.075
20 to 24	0.180	0.139	0.151	0.166	0.129	0.162
25 to 29	0.246	0.203	0.209	0.228	0.178	0.215
30 to 34	0.203	0.223	0.209	0.197	0.214	0.192
35 to 39	0.161	0.197	0.184	0.180	0.207	0.162
40 to 44	0.139	0.174	0.184	0.170	0.203	0.194
Level of education of the woman						
Less than secondary	0.374	0.275	0.148	0.417	0.308	0.195
Secondary	0.308	0.288	0.290	0.302	0.303	0.218
Non-university postsecondary	0.210	0.252	0.261	0.210	0.265	0.317
University	0.108	0.185	0.301	0.072	0.124	0.270
Level of education of the man						
Less than secondary	0.314	0.235	0.126	0.346	0.277	0.157
Secondary	0.195	0.195	0.227	0.213	0.223	0.164
Non-university postsecondary	0.314	0.326	0.314	0.298	0.318	0.387
University	0.177	0.245	0.333	0.143	0.183	0.292
Birth						
Both FS born in Quebec	0.006	0.003	0.002	0.747	0.679	0.522
One FS born in Quebec	0.016	0.013	0.008	0.094	0.099	0.110
Both born in Canada outside QC	0.679	0.607	0.529	0.054	0.061	0.062
Born in different countries	0.159	0.164	0.166	0.038	0.051	0.073
Born in the same country	0.141	0.213	0.295	0.067	0.110	0.233
First language						
Both English	0.675	0.606	0.546	0.049	0.047	0.041
Both French	0.033	0.022	0.012	0.793	0.727	0.582
One English and one French	0.039	0.032	0.021	0.043	0.040	0.039
Both the same other language	0.142	0.222	0.308	0.067	0.116	0.242
Different other languages	0.013	0.019	0.029	0.005	0.010	0.026
Other combination	0.099	0.098	0.084	0.044	0.060	0.070
Religion						
Different	0.284	0.276	0.222	0.057	0.074	0.097
The same	0.716	0.724	0.778	0.943	0.926	0.903
Foreign citizenship						
Neither	0.849	0.799	0.752	0.933	0.886	0.764
The man	0.026	0.030	0.033	0.012	0.017	0.026
The woman	0.047	0.063	0.081	0.019	0.033	0.066
Both	0.077	0.108	0.135	0.036	0.063	0.145

Table 2. Samples description. Proportions. Couples in which the woman is not in the labour force. 1991, 2001 and 2011 censuses. Data from the 20% samples that completed the long-form. Weighted estimation. (Continued)

	Canada without Quebec			Quebec		
	1991	**2001**		**1991**	**2001**	
Age difference between the woman and the man						
Woman at least 3 years older	0.056	0.071	0.064	0.056	0.068	0.068
Woman 1 or 2 years older	0.094	0.105	0.102	0.099	0.098	0.093
Same age	0.108	0.104	0.111	0.106	0.100	0.098
Woman 1 or 2 years younger	0.268	0.242	0.234	0.268	0.238	0.216
Woman 3 or 4 years younger	0.203	0.188	0.181	0.210	0.195	0.181
Woman 5 to 7 years younger	0.156	0.158	0.159	0.156	0.167	0.166
Woman at least 8 years younger	0.115	0.132	0.149	0.104	0.134	0.177
Owning the home						
No	0.271	0.287	0.285	0.274	0.321	0.387
Yes	0.729	0.713	0.715	0.726	0.679	0.613
Presence of children of different age groups (logical variables)						
0 to 5 years old	0.512	0.476	0.520	0.418	0.402	0.483
6 to 14 years old	0.468	0.467	0.448	0.486	0.461	0.405
15 to 17 years old	0.149	0.148	0.138	0.173	0.170	0.142
18 to 24 years old	0.144	0.182	0.122	0.160	0.161	0.131
Average income of the couple	44,278	55,962	73,369	38,793	46,254	58,021
Number of women	124,755	106,380	923,05	48,140	32,785	23,555

Table 3. Probability of living in a consensual union rather than being married among couples who live together. Logistic regression. Probability ratios. Couples in which the woman is in the labour force. 1991, 2001 and 2011 censuses. Data from the 20% samples that completed the long-form. Weighted estimation.

	Canada without Quebec			Quebec		
	1991	2001	2011	1991	2001	2011
Level of education and age of the woman						
Less than secondary	15.973***	34.782***	107.130***	3.345***	5.336***	15.754***
Secondary	5.375***	21.392***	75.924***	2.114**	3.987***	5.615***
Non-university postsecondary	9.923***	21.908***	81.943***	1.212	5.064***	4.042***
University	2.895***	15.479***	80.333***	0.712	4.599***	10.305***
(Less than secondary) Age	0.829***	0.841***	0.818***	0.857***	0.934***	0.872***
(Secondary) Age	0.809***	0.794***	0.815***	0.870***	0.883***	0.892***
Non-university postsecondary) Age	0.864***	0.826***	0.815***	0.880***	0.875***	0.897***
(University) Age	0.910***	0.785***	0.756***	1.023	0.879***	0.848***
(Less than secondary) Age^2	1.002***	1.002***	1.003***	1.001***	0.999***	1.001
(Secondary) Age^2	1.004***	1.004***	1.003***	1.001***	1.001*	1.001
(Non-university postsecondary) Age^2	1.002***	1.003***	1.003***	1.001***	1.001***	1.001*
(University) Age^2	1.001***	1.004***	1.005***	0.998***	1.002***	1.002***
ENDOGAMY						
Birth [Both born in Canada outside Quebec]						
Both FS born in Quebec	1.207*	1.983***	2.733***	2.281***	3.057***	2.443***
One FS born in Quebec	1.498***	1.545***	1.567***	2.177***	2.622***	1.879***
Born in different countries	0.986	0.972	0.965	1.009	1.078	0.894*
Born in the same country	0.427***	0.423***	0.437***	0.605***	0.528***	0.479***
First language [Both English]						
Both French	1.342***	1.676***	1.944***	1.824***	1.616***	2.783***
One English and one French	1.094**	1.197***	1.254***	1.306***	1.052	1.537***
Both the same other language	0.355***	0.346***	0.368***	0.312***	0.240***	0.392***
Different other languages	0.600***	0.554***	0.633***	0.540***	0.405***	0.582***
Other combination	0.862***	0.877***	0.871***	1.044	0.846**	1.128*
Same religion	0.590***	0.655***	0.756***	0.776***	0.812***	0.805***
Foreign citizenship [Neither]						
The man	0.831***	0.803***	0.791***	0.607***	0.660***	0.611***
The woman	0.800***	0.686***	0.692***	0.554***	0.602***	0.602***
Both	0.655***	0.512***	0.801***	0.565***	0.606***	0.721***
HOMOGAMY						
Age difference between the woman and the man [Woman 1 or 2 years younger]						
Woman at least 3 years older	4.336***	3.675***	2.820***	4.871***	4.011***	2.340***
Woman 1 or 2 years older	1.665***	1.570***	1.427***	1.642***	1.657***	1.359***
Same age	1.125***	1.111***	1.099***	1.102***	1.127***	1.103***
Woman 3 or 4 years younger	1.068***	1.084***	1.132***	1.123***	1.115***	1.061*
Woman 5 to 7 years younger	1.474***	1.376***	1.258***	1.646***	1.538***	1.218***
Woman at least 8 years younger	2.437***	1.993***	1.786***	3.260***	2.270***	1.465***

Table 3. Probability of living in a consensual union rather than being married among couples who live together. Logistic regression. Probability ratios. Couples in which the woman is in the labour force. 1991, 2001 and 2011 censuses. Data from the 20% samples that completed the long-form. Weighted estimation. (Continued)

	Canada without Quebec			Quebec		
	1991	2001	2011	1991	2001	2011
GENDER EQUALITY AND INDEPENDENCE						
Share of the woman's income in the couple's income by combined level of education						
W LT Secondary and M LT Secondary	1.005***	1.002**	1.001	1.006***	1.004**	1.002
W LT Secondary and M Secondary	1.008***	1.003*	1.002	1.008**	1.005*	1.000
W LT Secondary and M NUPS	1.005***	1.003*	1.002	1.009***	1.003	1.004
W LT Secondary and M University	1.008**	1.013***	1.009	1.007	1.004	0.988
W Secondary and M LT Secondary	1.004***	1.004***	1.002	1.007***	1.004**	1.005
W Secondary and M Secondary	1.007***	1.006***	1.002*	1.009***	1.005***	1.005*
W Secondary and M NUPS	1.010***	1.006***	1.003**	1.009***	1.008***	1.006***
W Secondary and M University	1.010***	1.006***	1.002	1.013***	1.009***	1.007**
W NUPS and M LT Secondary	1.004***	1.005***	1.001	1.003	1.003*	1.008***
W NUPS and M Secondary	1.004***	1.005***	1.002*	1.006***	1.004***	1.004*
W NUPS and M NUPS	1.005***	1.005***	1.003***	1.007***	1.005***	1.003**
W NUPS and M University	1.008***	1.007***	1.003**	1.008***	1.008***	1.003*
W University and M LT Secondary	1.002	1.000	1.001	1.001	0.996	1.004
W University and M Secondary	1.009***	1.004**	1.001	1.011***	1.004	1.000
W University and M NUPS	1.003*	1.003**	1.001	1.005**	1.001	1.001
W University and M University	1.009***	1.006***	1.005***	1.009***	1.008***	1.004***
Class of worker of the woman [Employed]						
Incorporated self-employed	0.833**	0.759***	0.739***	0.711***	0.687***	0.712***
Other self-employed	0.912**	0.882***	0.889***	1.045	0.813***	0.820***
Unpaid family worker	0.495***	0.704***	0.475***	0.443***	0.632***	0.788
Not applicable	1.411***	1.450***	1.033	1.033	1.099	0.860*
CONTROL VARIABLES						
Logarithm of the couple's income by combined level of education						
W LT Secondary and M LT Secondary	0.898***	0.903***	0.883***	0.985	0.974	0.968
W LT Secondary and M Secondary	0.881***	0.903***	0.869***	0.980	0.957	0.980
W LT Secondary and M NUPS	0.889***	0.890***	0.873***	0.984	0.981	0.956
W LT Secondary and M University	0.872***	0.860***	0.846***	1.000	0.990	0.995
W Secondary and M LT Secondary	0.989	0.969*	0.901***	0.989	1.025	1.014
W Secondary and M Secondary	0.952**	0.940***	0.871***	0.969	1.004	0.990
W Secondary and M NUPS	0.944***	0.933***	0.868***	0.974	0.999	0.994
W Secondary and M University	0.945**	0.928***	0.862***	0.973	1.000	0.983
W NUPS and M LT Secondary	0.885***	0.920***	0.875***	1.048	0.995	1.012
W NUPS and M Secondary	0.856***	0.895***	0.851***	1.026	0.976	1.016
W NUPS and M NUPS	0.855***	0.887***	0.842***	1.008	0.973	1.019
W NUPS and M University	0.828***	0.870***	0.832***	1.015	0.961*	1.011
W University and M LT Secondary	0.939*	0.986	0.915***	0.998	0.995	0.953
W University and M Secondary	0.893***	0.947**	0.894***	0.943	0.963	0.966
W University and M NUPS	0.900***	0.940***	0.884***	0.967	0.968	0.965
W University and M University	0.868***	0.914***	0.855***	0.947	0.928**	0.935**
Owning the home	0.398***	0.385***	0.451***	0.463***	0.574***	0.670***

Table 3. Probability of living in a consensual union rather than being married among couples who live together. Logistic regression. Probability ratios. Couples in which the woman is in the labour force. 1991, 2001 and 2011 censuses. Data from the 20% samples that completed the long-form. Weighted estimation. (Continued)

	Canada without Quebec			Quebec		
	1991	2001	2011	1991	2001	2011
Presence of children of different age groups (logical variables)						
0 to 5 years old	0.295***	0.380***	0.405***	0.454***	0.706***	0.767***
6 to 14 years old	0.479***	0.514***	0.502***	0.333***	0.507***	0.642***
15 to 17 years old	0.674***	0.607***	0.667***	0.505***	0.450***	0.717***
18 to 24 years old	0.491***	0.511***	0.563***	0.439***	0.343***	0.478***

* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$

Table 4. Probability of living in a consensual union rather than being married among couples who live together. Logistic regression. Probability ratios. Couples in which the woman is not in the labour force. 1991, 2001 and 2011 censuses. Data from the 20% samples that completed the long-form. Weighted estimation.

	Canada without Quebec			Quebec		
	1991	2001	2011	1991	2001	2011
Level of education and age of the woman						
Less than secondary	53.291***	44.648***	97.256***	16.294***	6.304***	24.165***
Secondary	38.644***	45.668***	98.952***	8.107***	4.387***	9.215**
Non-university postsecondary	47.053***	35.652***	100.732***	5.085**	5.055***	6.463***
University	9.336**	60.585***	145.577***	10.539*	9.989***	2.735
(Less than secondary) Age	0.806***	0.852***	0.885***	0.838***	0.927***	0.926**
(Secondary) Age	0.752***	0.808***	0.798***	0.817***	0.894***	0.932*
Non-university postsecondary) Age	0.789***	0.799***	0.818***	0.829***	0.899***	0.881***
(University) Age	0.794***	0.706***	0.733***	0.913	0.769***	0.901*
(Less than secondary) Age^2	1.003***	1.002***	1.001	1.001**	0.999*	0.999
(Secondary) Age^2	1.006***	1.003***	1.003***	1.003***	1.000	0.999
(Non-university postsecondary) Age^2	1.004***	1.004***	1.003***	1.002***	1.000	1.001
(University) Age^2	1.005***	1.007***	1.006***	1.000	1.005***	1.001
ENDOGAMY						
Birth [Both born in Canada outside Quebec]						
Both FS born in Quebec	1.596**	1.924***	1.236	1.766***	1.676***	1.635***
One FS born in Quebec	1.117	1.309**	1.142	2.057***	1.583***	1.327*
Born in different countries	0.786***	0.793***	0.710***	0.721	0.715*	0.800
Born in the same country	0.258***	0.295***	0.335***	0.454***	0.344***	0.311***
First language [Both English]						
Both French	1.356***	1.947***	2.367***	1.482*	2.811***	3.073***
One English and one French	1.184*	1.217**	1.413***	1.072	1.757***	1.833***
Both the same other language	0.630***	0.461***	0.321***	0.463***	0.457***	0.507***
Different other languages	0.898	0.644***	0.644***	0.517	0.709	0.604*
Other combination	1.140**	0.952	0.850**	1.003	1.290	1.294
Same religion	0.585***	0.620***	0.702***	0.777**	0.829*	0.822*
Foreign citizenship [Neither]						
The man	0.947	0.845	0.794*	0.411***	0.543***	0.588***
The woman	0.595***	0.432***	0.555***	0.312***	0.312***	0.300***
Both	0.540***	0.447***	0.731***	0.414***	0.364***	0.495***
HOMOGAMY						
Age difference between the woman and the man [Woman 1 or 2 years younger]						
Woman at least 3 years older	4.434***	2.955***	2.361***	4.686***	3.629***	2.280***
Woman 1 or 2 years older	1.697***	1.437***	1.407***	1.698***	1.442***	1.448***
Same age	1.077	1.124*	1.157**	1.195**	1.135*	1.203*
Woman 3 or 4 years younger	1.040	1.096*	1.045	0.961	1.026	1.059
Woman 5 to 7 years younger	1.393***	1.282***	1.303***	1.282***	1.256***	1.206*
Woman at least 8 years younger	2.282***	1.826***	1.624***	2.630***	1.868***	1.181*

Table 4. Probability of living in a consensual union rather than being married among couples who live together. Logistic regression. Probability ratios. Couples in which the woman is not in the labour force. 1991, 2001 and 2011 censuses. Data from the 20% samples that completed the long-form. Weighted estimation. (Continued)

|	Canada without Quebec				Quebec	
	1991	**2001**	**1991**	**2001**	**1991**	**2001**
GENDER EQUALITY AND INDEPENDENCE						
CONTROL VARIABLES						
Logarithm of the couple's income by combined level of education						
W LT Secondary and M LT Secondary	0.801***	0.864***	0.811***	0.862***	0.942*	0.888*
W LT Secondary and M Secondary	0.782***	0.845***	0.812***	0.853***	0.933**	0.876**
W LT Secondary and M NUPS	0.783***	0.848***	0.813***	0.846***	0.926**	0.871**
W LT Secondary and M University	0.750***	0.828***	0.771***	0.844***	0.904***	0.822***
W Secondary and M LT Secondary	0.839***	0.864***	0.860***	0.912*	0.975	0.923
W Secondary and M Secondary	0.796***	0.844***	0.836***	0.888**	0.943	0.908
W Secondary and M NUPS	0.787***	0.829***	0.830***	0.870**	0.950	0.914
W Secondary and M University	0.760***	0.801***	0.790***	0.875**	0.924*	0.881*
W NUPS and M LT Secondary	0.800***	0.891***	0.840***	0.932	0.939	1.017
W NUPS and M Secondary	0.751***	0.848***	0.805***	0.907*	0.928*	0.996
W NUPS and M NUPS	0.761***	0.845***	0.798***	0.902*	0.908**	0.990
W NUPS and M University	0.730***	0.805***	0.780***	0.903*	0.883***	0.967
W University and M LT Secondary	0.886	0.910*	0.861***	0.834	0.988	1.088
W University and M Secondary	0.863*	0.890**	0.842***	0.829	0.987	1.045
W University and M NUPS	0.855*	0.883**	0.833***	0.806*	0.955	1.049
W University and M University	0.831**	0.845***	0.805***	0.787*	0.928	0.998
Owning the home	0.356***	0.400***	0.469***	0.458***	0.579***	0.655***
Presence of children of different age groups (logical variables)						
0 to 5 years old	0.431***	0.520***	0.548***	0.657***	0.995	0.796***
6 to 14 years old	0.680***	0.673***	0.704***	0.463***	0.624***	0.710***
15 to 17 years old	0.821***	0.722***	0.742***	0.620***	0.578***	0.833**
18 to 24 years old	0.569***	0.565***	0.709***	0.424***	0.391***	0.588***

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

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Figure 1. Probability of living in a consensual union rather than being married among couples who live together according to the age of the woman and educational levels of the woman and the man. Canada without Quebec. Couples in which the woman is in the labour force. Logistic regression. Predicted values. 1991, 2001 and 2011 censuses. Data from the 20% samples that completed the long-form. Weighted estimation.

Level 1: Less than secondary. Level 2: Secondary. Level 3: Non-university postsecondary. Level 4: University.

Figure 2. Probability of living in a consensual union rather than being married among couples who live together according to the age of the woman and educational levels of the woman and the man. Quebec. Couples in which the woman is in the labour force. Logistic regression. Predicted values. 1991, 2001 and 2011 censuses. Data from the 20% samples that completed the long-form. Weighted estimation. See Figure 1 for levels.

Figure 3. Probability of living in a consensual union rather than being married among couples who live together according to the age of the woman and educational levels of the woman and the man. Canada without Quebec. Couples in which the woman is not in the labour force. Logistic regression. Predicted values. 1991, 2001 and 2011 censuses. Data from the 20% samples that completed the long-form. Weighted estimation. See Figure 1 for levels.

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