

The aspiration of everyone? Interest, timing and drivers of naturalisation for foreign citizens in Italy

Elisa Barbiano di Belgiojoso & Livia Elisa Ortensi***

**University of Milan – Bicocca, Italy*

***Alma Mater Studiorum – University of Bologna, Italy*

[Preliminary version for EPC 2020 conference selection - Please do not cite]

Abstract

Italy, along with other countries at the periphery of Europe, became an attractive destination country from the early '90s for its model of 'low regulation' of migration and job market. Despite restrictive laws, an increasing number of migrants is currently meeting the requirements to apply for Italian citizenship leading to a growing number of naturalisations. At the same time, a debate about revising the law in force is recurrently gaining momentum. The proposed revision of this law aims at relaxing the requirements for migrants arrived as children and second generations to ensure them an earlier integration. Drivers of naturalisation in Italy are currently under-researched, while this information is urgently needed to inform the debate and the process of policymaking. To fill this gap this paper relies on the most updated data on interest and intentions about naturalisation using data from the 2018 and 2019 wave of Observatory on Integration and Multiethnicity of the Italian Region of Lombardy (ORIM). At the same time, the paper revisits available evidence on the migration-naturalisation nexus in Italy. The provisional results show that interest in naturalisation cannot be taken for granted because reasons exist not to apply for citizenship. Moreover, applying for Italian citizenship seems more a choice of convenience than a decision built on the sense of belonging to Italy or the desire of having civil rights.

Note for the conveners: for our analyses, we will mainly use the pulled ORIM dataset 2018-2019. However, the 2019 ORIM wave will be released in December, therefore, the current results are provisional. Final results will be available for the conference.

1. Introduction

Citizenship is a recent and rising issue in Italy because only recently a significant number of migrants could fulfil the requirements to apply for naturalisation. Countries at the periphery of Europe, and Italy in particular, became attractive from the early '90s for their model of 'low regulation' of migration and labour market. Earlier migrants entered Italy more for reasons of opportunity rather than for an interest in the country and a relevant part of them spent the first years as undocumented. Most of them, however, regularised and settled becoming in time long-term migrants. Even if Italy represents a rather 'young' country of immigration, 5.1 million of its residents - corresponding to 8.5% of the total population in 2018 - are foreign citizens (Eurostat 2019). The potential transition to naturalisation, therefore, would affect a not negligible proportion of the resident population in Italy. The issue is also highly political: during 2017 an intense debate took place in Italy regarding the possibility of changing the current law based on the '*ius sanguinis*' principle. The proposed law, the so-called '*ius soli*' meant to allow a smoother transition to Italian citizenship especially for second-generation children born in Italy or for those who completed part of their formal education in Italian schools. In the end, the Italian Parliament did not approve the law. The debate, however, continued. In spring 2019 a news story reopened the discussion after that two second-generation children saved their classmates during the hijacking of a bus. More recently, with the beginning of the second government led by Conte and supported by centre-left parties, some activists and part of the civil society have called for a reform allowing the naturalisation for migrant children who attended school in Italy under the application of the so-called *ius culturae*.

The assumptions that drove the *ius soli/ius culturae* debate were mostly ideologic and overlooked most of the research findings of the citizenship-migration nexus in the European context. In the political discussion and media discourse about naturalisation, both politicians and public opinion took for granted two fundamental points. First, they assumed that allowing easier access to citizenship

would increase immigration rates, acting as a pull factor and driving to permanent settlement of migrants. Some politicians got to the point of declaring that the *ius soli* would have enhanced arrivals on the Italian seashores.

Second, nearly all actors in the debate took the interest of all foreign citizens into naturalisation for granted. According to this idea, all migrants are expected to apply for citizenship when they match the requirements.

The idea of naturalisation as a driver of immobility overlooks the impact of the process of European integration and, especially, of the removal of internal barriers to the movement of people on migrants' mobility practices and approaches to naturalisation. The European Union and, in particular the Schengen space, is widely seen as a laboratory for new transnational or post-national forms of citizenship (Olsen, 2012). Moreover, the acquisition of an EU citizenship allows easier mobility and migration also outside the Schengen space. Modern migration is growingly overcoming the static and linear two-node model of mobility predominant in the 19th and 20th and becoming a complex, dynamic, fluid, and reversible process (Ortensi and Barbiano di Belgiojoso, 2018; Van Mol & de Valk, 2016; Schapendonk & Steel, 2014; Toma & Castagnone, 2015). Especially when analysing migrants trajectories into time and space, it is evident that transition to citizenship cannot be only analysed and understood within the paradigm of the nation-state (Zhang, 2014). Recent evidence has shown that migrants use mobility rights related to naturalisation as an asset to achieve personal goals. This approach to naturalisation appears to be highly relevant and challenges the idea of naturalisation as the most advanced result in an integration process confined to a single nation-state (Bloemraad et al., 2008). Moreover, onward migration after the acquisition of Italian citizenship is known and documented phenomenon (Ortensi and Barbiano di Belgiojoso, 2018; Blangiardo 2019).

Recent research has shown that in the framework of the first years after the economic crisis, migrant families in Italy resorted to enhanced mobility rights obtained from naturalisation to react to growing unemployment risks. Citizenship emerged as a significant driver of reactive short-term intention of onward migration for families (Ortensi and Barbiano di Belgiojoso, 2018). At the same time, the

research underlined the role of citizenship in enhancing short-term intentions of young, educated men not cohabitating with a partner (ibidem).

Building on the previous literature on the relationship between citizenship and mobility among migrants in Italy and the current debate and about the *ius soli/ius culturae*, our study aims at clarifying two points. First: it is evident that naturalised migrants use their broader mobility rights to onward migrate to cope with unemployment. However, it is not clear if broader mobility rights and other similar advantages were the primary drivers of citizenship acquisition. In other words, migrants may acquire citizenship motivated by the sense of belonging and feeling of being Italians or by the will to gain political rights, while the importance of benefits related to broader rights of mobility and residence remains in the background. At the contrary, they may apply for citizenship mostly to acquire these benefits for themselves or their family regardless of their sense of belonging. With this paper, we want to understand what the main drivers of citizenship acquisition are. A second key point is about interest in naturalisation. We want to understand if data support the common assumption that nearly all migrants are interested in acquiring Italian citizenship.

We, therefore, aim at answering the following research questions:

RQ1: What is the level of interest of foreign citizens in the acquisition of Italian citizenships? What are the drivers of interest in naturalisation?

RQ2: What is the role of requirements in driving interest in naturalisation?

Survey data on interest and requirements for naturalisation are not available at the national level for Italy. For this reason, we will focus on information available for the Italian region of Lombardy. Since 2001 the Regional Observatory for Multiethnicity and Integration (ORIM) collect yearly survey data on citizens with a foreign background including information on naturalisation patterns. To answer these RQs we analyse data from the pulled dataset of the 2018 and 2019 survey carried out by the Regional Observatory for Multiethnicity and Integration (ORIM) of the Italian region of Lombardy. To describe the process of citizenship acquisition we will base our analysis on the pulled dataset of the 2017-2019 ORIM surveys.

2. Transition to citizenship: how does the literature define it?

Citizenship has become a focal point of debates about borders, sovereignty and migration. Endangered national identity is a growing popular topic among mass media, public opinion and the rhetoric of politicians because the naturalisation of migrants is eroding the very distinction between citizen and alien (Zhang, 2014; Jacobson, 1996). Accordingly, anxieties over the fate of national citizenship in the context of global migrations have led to stricter rules on conferring citizenship (Nyers and Rygiel, 2012). Since the turn of the century, several Central European countries extended socio-cultural integration requirements including formalised tests aimed at assessing language requirements and in some cases also cultural ones (Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2010). As naturalisation is an act transforming an alien in a member of a community, scholars have theorised the existence of a link between naturalisation and integration. However, if a relationship between socio-cultural integration and naturalisation is recognised, debate exists about the direction of this relationship. One paradigm considers naturalisation as a means of integration while others consider it as the highest degree of an immigrant's integration process (Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2010). While there is a growing emphasis on identity and belonging, migrants seem to approach citizenship by giving value to the set of rights associated and taking advantages of them. Mobility is growingly a resource employed by migrants. One of the most comprehensive transformations in this regard is brought about by the European Union (EU). As a consequence of the 'Treaty on the functioning of the European Union,' that states the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States thus mobility became a crucial advantage related to naturalisation particularly valued by the highly mobile migrant population. Mobility as the result of the acquisition of an EU citizenship is emerging as a distinctive trait of onward mobility from EU countries that challenges the idea of naturalisation as the most advanced result in an integration process confined to a single nation-state (Bloemraad et al., 2008). Although naturalised citizens are expected to settle in their new home country for the foreseeable future, some studies show that naturalisation may instead trigger the reactivation of a

never-fulfilled mobility (Ahrens et al., 2016; Della Puppa, 2016) or foster a reactive mobilisation of civic and social capital assets in times of crisis (Mas Giralt, 2017). Thinking citizenship through mobility challenges some of the foundational precepts central to modern citizenship, starting with the idea of a stable and sedentary population (Nyers and Rygiel, 2012; Zhang, 2014).

However, the assumption that all migrants, or at least the most integrated, wish to become citizens of the country where they chose to settle has not been confirmed. Studies that looked at measures of integration as determinants for naturalisation have found mixed results (Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2010). The need for not simplistically assume citizenship as a progressive institution within which all people wish to be incorporated has been raised by Hindness (1998).

[this section will be enriched in the final version of the article]

3. The case of Italy

3.1. The regulation of Italian citizenship acquisition and the political debate over the Ius-soli law

The current law for the acquisition of Italian citizenship dates back to the 5th of February 1992 (law 91/1992). Briefly, this law establishes that:

1. A foreign-born citizen can acquire Italian citizenship after 10 years of continuous and legal presence in Italy or by marriage with an Italian citizen.
2. A foreign-born child who lives in Italy acquires the Italian citizenship by transmission from the parents once they have acquired it.
3. A child born in Italy from foreign-born parents may apply for the Italian citizenship once came of age conditionally to a continuous residence in Italy since the birth.

On 2013, Cécile Kyenge -Italian Minister for Integration- questioned the law 91/1992. Her claim opened a long and intense political debate about the new proposed law that aimed at modifying the

acquisition of Italian citizenship only among the children of foreign-born parents. In particular, the law establishes two principles for the Italian acquisition:

1. *Temperate ius soli*: acquisition of Italian citizenship at birth for the children born in Italy by foreigner parents whom at least one with permanent sojourn permit.
2. *Ius culturae* with two different cases: first, minor children born in Italy from foreign-born parents or arrived before 12 years old can apply for Italian citizenship after having completed at least 5 years of school. Second, migrants arrived in Italy before 18 years old with at least 6 years of continuous residence in Italy and having attended and passed an entire cycle of education in Italy can apply for citizenship.

The debate became particularly intense after the refugees' crisis. The number of arrivals of migrants rescued in the Mediterranean Sea reached its highest peak when the Parliament's approval of law was due. The opponents of this law emphasised the potential role of this law as a pull factor for new migration flows. They also expected an increase in the number of naturalisations as the consequence of the relaxation of requirements. However, besides the political debate, some Italian demographers analysed the possible effects of the proposal. The e-book published by Neodemos (2017) –an Italian online journal about demographic issues- summarises this scientific debate highlighting three major points. First, the proposed law would not be revolutionary and would not completely alter the law in force. Second, the number of additional naturalisation would not increase dramatically. Third, this modification grounded on the idea to safeguard and integrate all those children born and grown-up in Italy or those who have studied in Italy and have acculturated to Italian culture. Indeed, the law would have modified the acquisition of citizenship process only for the second generations. Moreover some scholars pointed out that the impact of the new law was overestimated. An increasing number of migrants are going to fulfil the requirement of 10 years legal residence in Italy, and as a consequence, most of the second-generation migrants will acquire the citizenship in the next years by transmission from their parents or by elective choice even according to the current law. Therefore, the only real

novelty was the introduction of the '*ius culturae*'. Bonifazi et al. (2017) show that the new law would have implied approximately only 66,000 additional cases of naturalisation all related to migrants arrived before age 12 who attended Italian schools. The new law would have fastener the acquisition with some benefits for the second-generation migrants allowing them to feeling Italians. One additional element of the debate was the lack of interest in the acquisition of the Italian citizenship when naturalisation entails the waiver of the native citizenship, as happens for example to Chinese and Indian citizens (Blangiardo, 2017).


The intense debate finished with the non-approbation of the proposal at the end of December 2017. In October 2019 the debate gained new momentum after a new project of reform began its legislative procedure in the context of the Chamber of Deputies. However members of the second government ruled by Conte defined the issue "not a priority" for the country.

3.2 The acquisition of citizenship: some data on the Italian case

Due to the prolonged residence of migrants in Italy, the number of Italian citizenship acquisition has considerably increased since 2002 (Figure 1). About 1 million foreigners have become Italians during the last 15 years.


According to recent estimates (Bonifazi et al., 2017), the considerable increase in naturalizations is mainly attributable to the fulfilment of the 10 years-period of residence or to the transmission from parents to their children or to coming of age from the part of children born in Italy, while marriage with an Italian is a less relevant phenomenon (Figure 2).

Figure 1 - Acquisition of Italian citizenship in Italy 2002-2017



Source: Ismu elaborations on Istat data

Figure 2 - Acquisition of Italian citizenship in Italy 2002-2015 by motivations




Source: Bonifazi et al. 2017.

Note: 'Residenza' means residence, 'matrimonio' means marriage and 'trasmissione o elezione' means transmission or election.

Consistently with the territorial pattern of long-term settlement observed in Italy, naturalisations tend to occur in the northern and central part of the country

Figure 2 - Acquisition of Italian citizenship in Italy 2017. Percentages over non-EU resident citizens



Source: Blangiardo (2019)

3.3 Changing or acquiring another Citizenship: a balance between gains and losses

The acquisition of citizenship is not only ideally the last step of the integration process, but also a useful instrument to solve some daily ‘problems’ such as periodically bureaucratic procedures for the sojourn permit. Some of the advantages of acquiring Italian citizenship are strongly related to limitations regarding mobility rights implied by the citizenship of origin. The civic stratification introduced by the EU free movement, for example, has strongly reduced status differences between EU citizens and Italian natives, limiting them to the lack of voting rights for regional and national elections. Non-EU-citizens instead continue to face higher and different passport-based restrictions. If we consider the so-called ‘passport power’, i.e. the idea that passports imply effects on the holder’s

identity, opportunity and mobility, affecting the overall quality of life (Arton, 2018), it becomes clear that for nationals who are subjected to passport-based restrictions the acquisition of the Italian passport can considerably facilitate residence and legal access to the job market in other countries (Table 1), while for others the advantages are hardly relevant.

However, the act of naturalisation may also imply a set of disadvantages, especially for citizens whose states prohibit double citizenship. Table 1 summarises these two elements for the main sending countries in Italy. On the one side, the higher the distance between the passport index of the country of origin and the Italian, the higher the advantage regarding mobility. On the other side, the right of having double citizenship favours the interest for Italian citizenship, while the impossibility to have two citizenships can prevent from applying for the Italian one. Indians and Moroccans would both benefit from having an Italian passport, but while Morocco allows double citizenship, India does not. Therefore, Indians would have to renounce to their native citizenship, and this could reduce their interest in the Italian citizenship.

Table 1 - Passport Index and double citizenship for main sending countries. Year 2018.

	<i>Country of origin</i>	<i>Passport index Italy=164</i>	<i>Is double citizenship allowed?</i>
1	Romania	157	yes
2	Albania	109	yes
3	Morocco	67	yes
4	China	77	no
5	Ukraine	130	no
6	Philippines	69	yes
7	India	66	no
8	Bangladesh	44	yes
9	Moldova	111	yes under some circumstances
10	Egypt	55	yes

Source: <https://www.passportindex.org/> and <https://flagtheory.com/dual-citizenship/>

[In the final version of the paper this version will be integrated with a discussion of other drivers of citizenship acquisition]

4. Data and Methods

We used a pooled dataset obtained by combining two surveys produced by the Regional Observatory for Integration and Multi-ethnicity of Lombardy (ORIM). The ORIM survey is an annual face-to-face retrospective multipurpose survey carried out since 2001 by the Foundation for Initiatives and Studies on Multi-Ethnicity (ISMU). The survey refers to migrants from the main sending countries¹ aged 18 and over who were living in the Italian region of Lombardy at the time of the interview, including undocumented migrants and naturalised citizens (Blangiardo, 2018). The number of annual interviews varies from a minimum of 1,500 in 2018 to a maximum of 9,000 in 2006. The survey is designed explicitly to be representative at the regional level, and each year includes different questions on demographic, social, and economic events, as well as questions seeking the interviewees' opinions, values, and attitudes. To describe the process of citizenship acquisition, we used the Kaplan-Meier estimators. Kaplan-Meier is a non-parametric method for estimating the survival function. In this case, the event is the acquisition of the citizenship, the cases are (right) censored at the time of the survey and the time is measured in years since the arrival in Italy regardless of the sojourn status. For this analysis, we rely on the pulled dataset of the surveys carried out between 2017 and 2019 by ORIM.

To analyse drivers of interest in citizenship acquisition and its relationship with requirements, we restricted to the two most recent surveys (2018 and 2019), the only years where this information was collected. We will fit a probit regression model with an endogenous variable (possession of requirements).

As for the regression model, we added two variables measuring the gains and the losses of the naturalisation related to the specific country of origin of each migrant. The former is the passport index² that proxies the gains in having an Italian passport to verify the effect of the instrumental interest in naturalization. The latter indicates the possibility to have double citizenship according to

¹ All countries except former EU15 and EFTA countries, United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.

² Source: <https://www.passportindex.org/>

the law of the country of origin³ and this proxies a possible reason for not applying for Italian citizenship.

5. Results [*Provisional*]

Descriptive Results

According to our data, 18.3% of the migrants settled in Lombardy have Italian citizenship. Also, our results indicate that approximately 20%⁴ of the foreign-born individuals without Italian citizenship have applied for it.


Migrants from Northern Africa have a higher percentage of Italian citizens (28.1%), while only 6% of the EU migrants have Italian citizenship. 40% acquired citizenship more than 10 years ago. 55.8% are women.

Our data confirm previous evidence that the time to acquire Italian citizenship is *de-facto* considerably longer than the 10 years stated by law (Strozza 2017), as shown by the Kaplan-Meier analysis in Figure 3. Within the first 10 years in Italy, only a few migrants acquire Italian citizenship and, if we excluded migrants married with an Italian, the acquisitions within this period reduce further. After 15 years since the arrival, about 25% has acquired citizenship. This finding is not surprising: usually, migrants register themselves in the Population Register after a couple of years, in some cases after spending some time as undocumented. Legal migrants need 10 years of continuous residence, and finally, the process for the acquisition of citizenship takes on average approximately 3 years (Strozza, 2017).

³Source: <https://flagtheory.com/dual-citizenship/>

⁴ This information is available only for the 2018 survey.

Figure 3 – Citizenship acquisition: Kaplan-Meier survival estimate along the migration experience.



Source: own elaboration on ISMU data survey 2017 and 2018.

Note: the starting point is the year of arrival in Italy regardless of the juridical status of the migrant.

5.2 The interest in Italian citizenship: a neglected issue.

The delay in the Italian acquisition and the low rate of naturalised migrants, shown in Figure 3, are not only due to the lengthy bureaucratic procedure or due to the mismatching of the requirements. Lack of interest in naturalisation also plays a crucial role. As stated before, the naturalisation is commonly considered as a goal for each migrant. However, the acquisition of Italian citizenship is not the aspiration of all the migrants, as shown in Table 2. According to 2018 data, among migrants without citizenship (701 cases), 28.6% are not interested in becoming Italian. The majority (70.7%) does not fit the requirements; however, a small group, despite matching the requirements, is not

interested in acquiring Italian citizenship. 55.0% is interested in becoming citizens but does not yet fit the requirements.

Table 2 – Interest in Italian citizenship and fitting the requirements to apply among migrants without Italian citizenship. Year 2018.

<i>Interest in citizenship</i>	<i>Requirements to apply for citizenship</i>		
	No	Yes	Total
No	15.7%	12.9%	28.6%
Yes	55.0%	16.4%	71.4%
Total	70.7%	29.3%	100.0%

Source: own elaborations on ISMU survey 2018.

Only for the 2018 survey, we can analyse the self-declared motivation to apply or not for Italian citizenship. The main motivations to apply concern, on the one side, the simplification of the bureaucratic procedure related to the sojourn permit, on the other side, the new opportunities granted by the status of citizen, such as freedom of movements around the world and the advantages for the other family members (Table 3). While ‘feeling Italian’ is reported only by a minority and ‘acquiring civil rights’ is rarely mentioned as a motivation (1.2%). These results indicate that the acquisition of Italian citizenship is a ‘marriage of convenience’, the primary driver is opportunism rather than an integration achievement.

Table 3 – Motivation for applying or not for Italian citizenship. Year 2018.

<i>Interested in citizenship</i>		<i>Disinterested in citizenship</i>	
<i>Motivations</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Motivations</i>	<i>%</i>
No more problems with the bureaucracy	43.5	Waiver of native citizenship	13.7
Mobility and work within Europe	18.3	Satisfied with the current situation	33.0
Work in public administration and access to competitive exams	3.5	I have a short-term migratory project	15.4
Acquisition of civil rights	1.2	Not feeling Italian	13.7
I could guarantee facilities to my family	23.6	I will never fit the requirements	1.6
Feeling Italian	5.3	Other reasons	22.5
Other reasons	4.7		
N	513	N	182

Source: own elaborations on ISMU survey 2018.

Conversely, the lack of interest in the acquisition of the Italian citizenship is mostly related to satisfaction with the present status, to the fact that double citizenship is not allowed in the country of origin, to a short-term project or to do not feeling Italian. It should be noticed that among 'not interested despite fitting the requirements' the waiver of native citizenship is a crucial reason for their disinterest.

Multivariate Analysis

[The results based on the pulled dataset 2018-2019 will be available at the time of the conference]

The results of the model allow us to identify the determinants of the interest in naturalisation. The results confirm the instrumental function of the citizenship: the higher the gains, the higher the interest in naturalisation and, the other way around, the higher the losses, the lower the interest in becoming Italian. Having a more powerful passport, as it is the Italian one, is strongly and positively related to being interested in Italian citizenship. Not surprisingly, the interest in naturalisation considerably decreases if double citizenship is not allowed in the country of origin. Another result supports this instrumental interest in naturalization: interest does not increase along with the acculturation process in our country either with the sense of belonging to Italy that should be higher for migrants arrived at a younger age.

Children are an important driver in the naturalization process: migrants with children are more likely to be interested in becoming Italian citizens since this allows them to transmit this right also the offspring.

Migrants are more likely to be interested in naturalization once they have fulfilled the requirements. However, it should be noticed that the lack of requirements does not prevent migrants from desiring Italian citizenship.

6. Conclusion [Preliminary]

The growing stability of migrant settlement in Italy increased the number of migrants matching the requirements needed to apply for Italian citizenship. At the same time, the increasing number of second and from 1.25 to 1.75 generation youngsters are becoming of age.

These trends stimulated an intense political debate about the opportunity to modify a law that, dating back to 1992, is mostly designed to preserve the descent and heritage of Italian emigrants. The law in force still answers more to the needs of an emigration country, grounded on the idea of the *ius sanguinis*. The debate ended with the Parliament's decision of rejecting the proposal of a new law relaxing requirement for second-generation children and for foreign-born children who carried out their studies in Italy.

The political debate and the media discourse on the topic were mostly misleading.

First, it was assumed that the proposed law would significantly increase the number of applications. On the contrary, the majority of children of migrants will acquire citizenship by transmission or election in a short time even according to the current law (Bonifazi et al., 2017). Second, it was implied that citizenship is the aspiration of the majority of migrants. This assumption relates to the fact that citizenship is both an essential step in the integration as well as an instrument for obtaining more advantages.

Our results, even if provisional, answer to our research questions by highlighting relevant results. First, the interest in naturalisation cannot be taken for granted. This finding has an important theoretical consequence: the analysis of citizenship acquisition cannot avoid the 'interest' dimension. A dimension that should be considered in the political debate when revising the law in force for naturalisation. Second, our preliminary results suggest that reasons to become Italian are mostly related to the perceived advantages of having an Italian passport, while migrants aspiring to become Italian because they feel Italian or want to gain political rights are a minority. Naturalisation seems therefore in most cases a choice of convenience rather than a passage related to an achieved sense of belonging to Italy. Finally, our results suggest that the advantages are not the same for all migrants,

highlighting that migrants also have reasons not to apply for naturalisation. Becoming Italian is a decision based on gains and losses secured by the status of citizen.

These are only preliminary results, however, they are of particular interest for the Italian case considering that the idea of modifying the law in force has not been completely abandoned and the proposal recently re-emerged on the political debate.

References

Ahrens, J., Kelly, M., & van Liempt, I. (2016). Free movement? The onward migration of EU citizens born in Somalia, Iran, and Nigeria. *Population, Space and Place*, 22(1), 84–98.

Arton, 2018 The Passport Index 2018. World's passports in your pocket. Internet Resource.
<https://www.passportindex.org/>

Blangiardo G.C. (2019). Indagine conoscitiva in materia di politiche dell'immigrazione, diritto d'asilo e gestione dei flussi migratori Audizione del Presidente dell'Istituto nazionale di statistica Prof. Gian Carlo Blangiardo. I Commissione (Affari Costituzionali) Camera dei Deputati. Roma, 18 settembre 2019.

Blangiardo, G. C. (2018). L'immigrazione straniera in Lombardia. In *Indagine 2018*. Milan: Osservatorio Regionale per l'Integrazione e la Multietnicità.

Blangiardo, G. C. (2017). Con lo ius soli nasce la nuova categoria dei minori “scompagnati”. In *Neodemos op. cit.*

Bloemraad I., Korteweg A., Yurdakul G. (2008) Citizenship and Immigration: Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and Challenges to the Nation-State *Annual Review of Sociology* 34:153-179

Bonifazi C., Conti C. and Rottino M. (2017). Alcuni numeri sulla cittadinanza. In *Neodemos op. cit.*

- DaVanzo, J. (1976). Differences between return and non return migration: An econometric analysis. *International Migration Review*, 10(1), 13–27.
- Della Puppa, F. (2016). Ambivalences of the emotional logics of migration and family reunification: Emotions, experiences and aspirations of Bangladeshi husbands and wives in Italy. *Identities*, 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.2016.1238381>
- Ersanilli E., Koopmans R., (2010) Rewarding Integration? Citizenship Regulations and the Socio-Cultural Integration of Immigrants in the Netherlands, France and Germany. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36(5):773-791.
- Eurostat (2018). Online Database. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database>
- Hindness (1998) Divide and Rule: the international character of modern citizenship. *European Journal of Social Theory*. 1 (1): 57-70. <https://doi.org/10.1177/136843198001001005>
- Jacobson, D. (1996). *Rights Across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship*. London: The John Hopkins University Press.
- Mas Giralt, R. (2017). Onward migration as a coping strategy? Latin Americans moving from Spain to the UK post-2008. *Population, Space and Place*, 23, e2017.
<https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.2017>
- Neodemos (2017). *Ius soli ius culturae*. Un dibattito sulla cittadinanza dei giovani migranti. <http://www.neodemos.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/E-book-IUS-SOLI4.pdf>
- Nyers, P., and K. Rygiel, eds. 2012. *Citizenship, Migrant Activism and the Politics of Movement*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Olsen, E. (2012). *Transnational citizenship in the European Union: past, present, and future*. London ; New York: Continuum International Publishing Group.

- Ortensi L.E., Barbiano di Belgiojoso E. (2018). Moving on? Gender, education, and citizenship as key factors among short-term onward migration planners. *Population Space and Place* 24(5): 1-13. Doi: 10.1002/psp.2135
- Schapendonk, J., & Steel, G. (2014). Following migrant trajectories: The im/mobility of sub-Saharan Africans en route to the European Union. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 104(2), 262–270.
- Strozza S. (2017). Ridurre i tempi per diventare italiani: meglio per tutti, ma soprattutto per i figli degli immigrati. In *Neodemos op.cit.*
- Toma, S., & Castagnone, E. (2015). What drives onward mobility within Europe? The case of Senegalese migrations between France, Italy and Spain. *Population*. *Population*, 70, 69–101.
- Van Mol, C., & de Valk, H. (2016). Migration and immigrants in Europe: A historical and demographic perspective. In B. Garcés-Mascareñas, & R. Penninx (Eds.), *Integration processes and policies in Europe IMISCOE Research Series*. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21674-4_3pp.31-55
- Zhang C. (2014). *Territory, Rights and Mobility: Theorizing the citizenship/migration nexus in the context of Europeanisation*. Ph.D Thesis LUISS & Université libre de Bruxelles: Rome, Brussels.