

Are Asylum Seekers from Conflict-Affected Countries to Europe Economic Migrants?

Tomoya Suzuki

Faculty of Economics

Kansai University

Osaka 564-8680 Japan

tomoya@kansai-u.ac.jp

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9462-7511>

Abstract

The number of asylum seekers in Europe began increasing rapidly in the early 2010s, with the annual increase being significantly high in 2015. According to the asylum statistics of the European Commission, the number of first-time applicants for asylum in the European Union (EU) exceeded 1.2 million in 2015. Not surprisingly, many asylum applicants were from conflict-affected countries. Syrian, Afghan and Iraqi applicants accounted for the top three citizenships of first-time asylum applicants in the EU during the second quarter of 2018. This study investigates the driving forces of asylum seekers by using data on the number of asylum applicants in European countries from conflict-affected countries. To achieve this purpose, a gravity model of migration was employed. A major finding is that difference in the level of per capita income between two countries do not significantly influence the net flows of asylum seekers between the countries. By contrast, asylum seekers are significantly attracted to countries in which thrift and efforts in education are encouraged as a way to prepare for the future. And, the ratio of government expenditures on tertiary education to gross domestic product in a host country also significantly increases the net inflows of asylum seekers to the country. Thus, the conclusion is that asylum seekers do not come to European countries not because the levels of per capita income in the countries are high, but because the countries allow the new comers to prepare for the future through opportunities to receive tertiary education.

Keywords: Asylum Seekers, Economic Migrants, Conflict-affected, Europe

1. Introduction

Europe recently experienced a surge of asylum seekers. However, the numbers of asylum applicants varied across European countries. The asylum statistics on the Eurostat website revealed that Germany was by far the most popular country for asylum seekers coming to Europe in 2018.¹ And, many of asylum applicants in Europe recently came from conflict-affected countries. According to the same statistics, Syrian, Afghan and Iraqi applicants accounted for the top three citizenships of first-time asylum applicants in the European Union (EU) during the second quarter of 2018.

Such asylum applicants may or may not be recognised as refugees in their destination countries. Neumayer (2005) showed that asylum recognition rates in Western Europe significantly varied over time and across the destination countries. As Collier (2013, ch3) argued, this is at least partly because large financial gains from migration induce voluntary economic migrants to seek asylum. If many of asylum applicants prioritise improvement in the economic quality of life, inflows of asylum seekers will significantly respond to changes in their destination countries' economic conditions. Thus, the first

¹ The web address of the Eurostat is https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics (accessed on 2 September 2019).

question in this study is how the inflows of asylum seekers from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria to European countries reacted to changes in macroeconomic conditions.

The literature on international migration also identified other various factors for migration. A notable example of such factors is cultural difference between source and destination countries. Therefore, the second question in this study is how responsive the inflows of asylum applicants from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria to Europe were to cultural difference between the source and destination countries. Answering this question may contribute to the understanding of preferences of asylum seekers about societies to live in.

The next section reviews the literature on migrants and asylum seekers. In the recent empirical literature, generalised linear models (GLM) are often employed because non-negative counted data on asylum seekers, migrants and/or refugees require a disturbance term to be non-normally distributed. This study employs GLMs, and the third section describes the GLMs for assessing the decision making of asylum seekers in Europe concerning their location. The GLMs are estimated using data on inflows of asylum applicants in Europe from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. The fourth section discusses the estimation results and answers the above mentioned questions. The fifth section concludes.

2. Literature Review

Angeloni and Spano (2018) summarised the tendency of the literature on migration to focus on voluntary migrants rather than forced migrants, and yet argued for the importance of insights gained from such literature for research on the location choice of asylum seekers. This section reviews not only the literature on asylum seekers but also that on voluntary migrants. An empirical migration model that includes distance between countries as an explanatory variable is called a ‘gravity model’. The name comes from Isaac Newton’s gravitational law stating that the force between two objects depends negatively on the distance between them. Belot and Ederveen (2012), Fitzgerald, Leblang and Teets (2014), Lewer and Van den Berg (2008), White (2016, ch8) and White and Buehler (2018) included geodesic distance between countries as an explanatory variable in the empirical models and found that geodesic distance between countries significantly decreased net migration flows between the countries. Hatton (2017) found a similar effect of geodesic distance between countries on the international flows of asylum seekers.

Nonetheless, the geodesic distance between source and destination countries may not play a crucial role in the international flows of asylum seekers. For instance, approximately half a million of asylum seekers from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria passed through European countries on the long way to Germany in 2016.² This does not suggest that distance between countries may be excluded from the set of explanatory variables for the international flows of asylum seekers. Rather, there is no need to confine the definition of distance between countries in a gravity model for asylum seekers to the geodesic context.

Distance between two countries may be measured as cultural difference between the countries. In the study of domestic migration, Falck, Lameli and Ruhose (2018) calculated cultural distance using data on historical dialect dissimilarity between German counties. However, this method is not readily available for the study of international migration. Belot and Ederveen (2012) studied the effect of cultural difference between countries on the international migration flows and, for this purpose, constructed a single composite index of cultural distance between countries from several

² The data on ‘inflows of foreign asylum seekers by nationality’ are available from the International Migration Database on the website of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): <https://stats.oecd.org> (accessed on 24 December 2018).

indexes available on the Hofstede Insights website.³ White (2016, ch8) and White and Buehler (2018) also used the Hofstede cultural indexes arguing against the use of such a single composite measure because there are multiple dimensions of difference in culture between countries. This study uses the Hofstede cultural indexes and measures cultural distance between source and destination countries in several dimensions.

In the literature on international migration, it is also common to investigate the effect of economic difference between two countries on the international migration flows. Davenport, Moore and Poe (2003) found that decreases in per capita income in source countries did not significantly push forced migrants out of the countries. By contrast, Moore and Shellman (2004) estimated that decreases in per capita income in source countries significantly pushed asylum seekers out of the countries. On the other hand, Neumayer (2004) and Angeloni (2016) estimated that increases in per capita income in destination countries significantly pulled asylum seekers into the countries. Hatton (2017) found that flows of asylum seekers were insignificantly and significantly influenced by per capita income in source countries and that in destination countries, respectively. Thus, evidence is mixed when it comes to the effects of per capita income

³ The web address of the Hofstede Insights is <https://www.hofstede-insights.com>.

in source and destination countries on flows of asylum seekers. This study also includes economic variables in the set of explanatory variables.

Political stability may also play an important role in the flows of asylum seekers. Collier and Hoeffler (2018) used the ‘polity score’ published by the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) to represent the political stability in each of many countries and found that the score had only a small effect on the international flows of voluntary migrants.⁴ However, it is unclear whether their finding can be carried over to the case of asylum seekers. Therefore, this study also uses the polity score and investigates the effect of the political stability between source and destination countries.

Refugees from conflict-affected countries are distinguished from voluntary migrants in that the personal security of the formers is threatened by the conflicts in their home countries. Davenport, Moore and Poe (2003) used data on 129 countries during the period of 1964 to 1989 and estimated that the effects of genocide and/or politicide on the number of emigrant refugees and internally displaced people were significantly positive. Moore and Shellman (2004) also used a global sample over more than forty years and found that government forces and dissident forces made people leave their

⁴ The web address of the CSP is <https://www.systemicpeace.org>.

homes. Thus, a conflict in a source country may be a push factor for asylum seekers, and this study lets the push factor be represented by the number of battle-related deaths in each of Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.

As a pull factor for asylum seekers, the stock of immigrants in a destination country from a source country should be also considered. Collier (2013, ch6) argued that diasporas generally provide new comers with not only local information about employment opportunities but also the opportunities themselves. Beine, Docquier and Özden (2011) found that diaspora accounted for more than 70% of the variation in the migration flows from 195 countries to 30 OECD countries between 1990 and 2000. Collier and Hoeffler (2018) estimated that the effects of diasporas in destination countries on the inflows of international migrants to the countries were significantly positive. When it comes to forced migrants, Day and White (2001) found through interviews that Bosnian and Somali refugees were pulled into the United Kingdom (UK) by the existence of family or friendship connections. Hatton (2017) found that the stocks of migrants in destination countries significantly increased asylum applications from the same source countries. This study considers the stocks of immigrants from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria in European countries to capture the pull factor.

3. Model

The dependent variable in the model is the annual number of asylum seekers in a destination country from a source country and is denoted by $asylum_{ij}$, where the subscripts i and j denote the destination and source countries, respectively.⁵ The destination countries in the sample are Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Switzerland (CHE), Czech (CZE), Germany (DEU), Denmark (DNK), Spain (ESP), Estonia (EST), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), the United Kingdom (GBR), Greek (GRC), Hungary (HUN), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), Luxemburg (LUX), Netherland (NLD), Norway (NOR), Poland (POL), Slovakia (SVK), Slovenia (SVN) and Sweden (SWE). The other European countries are excluded from the sample due to non-availability of data on the dependent variable and/or some explanatory variables shown below. Figure 1 plots the total number of asylum seekers from the three countries to these European countries and shows a surge of the number in 2015. The full sample spans the period of 2001 to 2016. However, the number of observations used for the estimation in the following section is smaller than would be expected for the sample period due to the limited availability of data on some explanatory variables.

⁵ The data on $asylum_{ij}$ are ‘inflows of asylum seekers by nationality’ and are available from the OECD website shown in the footnote 2 (accessed on 24 December 2018).

The set of explanatory variables is chosen based on the literature surveyed in the preceding section. As economic difference between source and destination countries, this study follows White (2016, ch8) and White and Buehler (2018) and measures economic difference between two countries by the ratio of per capita real income in the destination country to that in the source country, $rely_{ij}$.⁶ A significantly positive coefficient of $rely_{ij}$ would be consistent with a hypothesis that asylum seekers move from the conflict-affected countries to European countries in search of better economic living standards there. The other economic variables are the unemployment rates in destination and source countries, $unempl_i$ and $unempl_j$.⁷ The coefficient of $unempl_i$ is expected to be negative because once the destination countries accept asylum seekers as refugees, they will eventually have to work there. On the other hand, $unempl_j$ will have a significantly positive coefficient if asylum seekers are pushed out by poverty rather than conflicts in the home countries.

⁶ The data on per capita real income are ‘GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international \$)’ and are available from the World Development Indicators on the website of the World Bank: <https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators> (accessed on 26 December 2018).

⁷ The data on the unemployment rates are ‘Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate)’ and are available from the World Bank website as shown in the footnote 6 (accessed on 4 January 2019).

This study also follows White (2016, ch8) and White and Buehler (2018) and measures cultural difference between source and destination countries using the Hofstede cultural indexes.⁸ Among the Hofstede indexes, a first one examines each country's culture in terms of power distance (*PD*), which expresses people's tendency to accept a hierarchical order. A second one evaluates each country's culture in terms of individualism (*IDV*), which reflects people's preference to take care of only themselves and their immediate families. A third one is related to masculinity (*MAS*), which represents people's preference for achievement, heroism, assertiveness and material rewards for success. A fourth one is about uncertainty avoidance (*UA*), which measures how uncomfortable people feel with uncertainty and ambiguity. The other one is an index of long-term orientation (*LTO*), which refers to people's preference of handling future challenges with a pragmatic approach over maintaining time-honoured tradition.⁹ This study uses the Hofstede cultural indexes for the sample countries other than Afghanistan because the Hofstede indexes are not published for the country. The similar indexes estimated by Rarick et al. (2013) are used for Afghanistan.

⁸ The Hofstede indexes are available from the Hofstede Insights website shown in the footnote 3 (accessed on 30 December 2018).

⁹ There is another Hofstede index, which is an index of indulgence. However, it is not available for Afghanistan or Syria. Therefore, this study ignores the indulgence index.

White (2016, ch8) and White and Buehler (2018) used each of the Hofstede indexes and defined cultural distance between countries as the absolute difference of the countries' index values. However, this definition makes it obscure which cultural characteristics of destination countries attract many asylum seekers. Suppose that the *MAS* score of a destination country exceeds that of a source country by a certain number. This case implies that asylum seekers prefer competitive societies to cooperative ones. By contrast, suppose that the *MAS* score of the destination country is smaller than that of the source country by the same number as above. This case implies the exactly opposite preference that asylum seekers prefer cooperative societies to competitive ones. Nonetheless, the absolute difference between the *MAS* scores treats the two cases as if they were identical. Therefore, this study measures cultural difference by the excess of a destination country's Hofstede index over a source country's same index, which may be negative or positive. For instance, cultural difference with respect to masculinity is given by $MAS = MAS_i - MAS_j$

In relation to *LTO* among the Hofstede indexes, an opportunity of higher education in Europe should be considered. This is because as the Hofstede Insights explains, societies with high *LTO* scores encourage thrifts and efforts in modern education as a way to

prepare for the future.¹⁰ Tertiary education systems are generally well established in many of European countries, which may be attractive not only to voluntary migrants but also to asylum seekers. This study investigates the importance of education opportunities in Europe for asylum seekers and includes the ratio of government expenditures on tertiary education to GDP in a destination country, $eduy_i$.¹¹

The set of explanatory variables also includes political difference between source and destination countries. For this purpose, this study follows Collier and Hoeffler (2018) and uses the polity score that the CSP annually publishes. The current version of the polity score is Polity IV, and it covers 167 countries. The polity score ranges from -10 in autocratic countries to 10 in fully democratic countries. Political difference between two countries might be appropriately defined as the excess of the polity score in the destination country over that in the source country. However, this study uses the polity

¹⁰ See the Hofstede Insights website shown in the footnote 3.

¹¹ The data are computed from ‘Expenditure on tertiary education (% of government expenditure on education)’ and ‘Government expenditure on education, total (% of GDP)’, which are available from the World Bank website shown in the footnote 6 (accessed on 25 June 2019).

scores in the destination countries, $polity_i$ due to the scarcely available data on the polity scores in the source countries.¹²

The other explanatory variables are as follows. As Day and White (2001) and Hatton (2017) found, the stock of immigrants in a destination country from a source country may be a pull factor for asylum seekers from the source country and hence is an explanatory variable, which is denoted by $stockim_{ij}$.¹³ As Davenport, Moore and Poe (2003) and Moore and Shellman (2004) underscored, a push factor should be also considered. This study uses the annual number of battle-related deaths in the source country, $battledeath_j$.¹⁴ This study also includes a dummy variable of the year 2015 because as Figure 1 shows, the number of asylum applicants in Europe significantly jumped up in the year. Finally, a constant term, a linear time trend term and a quadratic time trend term are included.

This study uses a generalised linear model (GLM) with a log link function because the dependent variable is a count variable that always takes a non-negative integer value.

¹² The data are available from the website of CSP shown in the footnote 4 (accessed on 28 December 2018).

¹³ The data are ‘stock of foreign-born population by country of birth’ and available from the OECD website shown in the footnote 2.

¹⁴ The data are ‘battle-related deaths (number of people)’ and are available from the World Bank website shown in the footnote 6.

The simplest form would be a Poisson model in which the variance of a count variable is assumed to equal its mean, μ . A problem with such a Poisson model is that a count variable is generally more volatile than would be expected in the model. A negative binomial (NB) model can deal with such overdispersion. As Hilbe (2011, Ch 8) showed, Poisson and NB models are Poisson-gamma mixture model. A NB model differs from a Poisson model in that the former has a dispersion parameter, α . A count variable's variances are μ , $\mu + \alpha\mu$ and $\mu + \alpha\mu^2$ in the Poisson, NB1 and NB2 models, respectively. In fact, the sample mean and standard deviation of *asylum* are 4,087.4 and 18,146.8, respectively. Therefore, this study uses NB models in which the link function is a log function given by

$$\ln \text{asylum}_{ij,t} = X_{t-1}\beta$$

where X , β and t denote a vector of covariates, its coefficient vector and time subscript, respectively. Note that this sort of NB models are often augmented to zero-inflated NB models. However, the theoretically expected and actual numbers of zeros in the sample of *asylum*_{*ij*} are 56 and only nine, respectively. Therefore, this study does not consider zero-inflated NB models.

4. Estimation Results

The NB1 and NB2 models are estimated using R 3.5.2 with its ‘gamlss’ package. Tables 1 and 2 show the estimation results based on the NB1 and NB2 models, respectively. Many of the coefficients are significantly different from zero, at least at 10 percent significance level. For instance, *battledeath_j* represents a conflict in a source country and has a significantly positive coefficient at one percent significance level in the two models. Thus, as is expected, the conflict is a significant push factor. As a pull factor, the coefficient of *stockim_{ij}* is significantly positive at one percent and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. The significance is consistent with the findings in the literature that the stock of immigrants in a destination country from a source country attracts asylum seekers from the source country. As another pull factor, the coefficient of *polity_i* is significantly positive at 10 percent and one percent significance levels in the NB1 and NB2 models, respectively. Thus, the political stability in a destination country is also a significant pull factor.

In relation to the first question of this study, the tables show how macroeconomic conditions in source and destination countries influence the international flows of asylum seekers. The coefficient of *rely_{ij}* is positive as expected. The coefficient is significant at one percent significance level in the NB2 model, but not significant at any

conventional significance level in the NB1 model. Thus, evidence is mixed concerning the effect of relative income between source and destination countries on the international flows of asylum seekers. Second, the coefficient of $unempl_j$ was negative and at odds with the expectation in the two models. However, it is insignificant and barely significant at 10 percent significance level in the NB1 and NB2 models, respectively. It is hard to say that a high unemployment rate in a source country pushes asylum seekers out of the country. Finally, the coefficient of $unempl_i$ is significantly negative as expected at one percent significance level in the two models. The significance is consistent with a hypothesis that a low unemployment rate in a destination country pulls asylum seekers from abroad. However, note that once asylum seekers settle in Europe as refugees, they will have to look for jobs. In sum, it is hard to conclude that asylum seekers move from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria to Europe in search of better economic life.

Then, what sort of life do asylum seekers expect to spend in Europe? The estimated coefficients of the cultural variables may give us a clue to answering this question. First, the coefficient of PD is significantly positive at one percent significance level in the NB1 model. People in societies with high PD scores tend to accept a hierarchical order. While the average PD score of the European countries in the sample is 46.3, the PD

scores of Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria are 21, 95 and 85, respectively. Thus, the *PD* scores of the European countries are lower on average than those of Iraq and Syria. Table 1 implies that asylum seekers from Iraq and Syria choose societies similar to their homes in terms of power distance. However, evidence for this implication is mixed because as Table 2 shows, the coefficient of *PD* is not significant at any conventional significance level in the NB2 model.

Second, the coefficient of *MA* is also significantly positive at one percent significance level in the two models. People in societies with high *MA* scores prefer competitive societies to cooperative ones. The average *MA* score of the European countries is 48.2 and is lower than the *MA* scores of the source countries. The *MA* scores of Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria are 89, 70 and 52, respectively. Thus, Tables 1 and 2 suggest that asylum seekers particularly from Afghanistan and Iraq may prefer societies similar to their homes in terms of masculinity.

Third, *LTO* also has a positive coefficient and is significant at one percent level in the two models. Societies with high *LTO* scores encourage thrift and education as a way to prepare for the future. The average *LTO* score of the European countries is 58.0 and is significantly higher than the *LTO* score in any of the source countries. The *LTO* scores of Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria are only 36, 25 and 30, respectively. Thus, asylum seekers

from the conflict-affected countries may choose societies that are more long-term oriented than their homes. In line with the significance of *LTO*, the coefficient of *eduy_i* is positive in the two models. Although *eduy_i* is insignificant in the NB2 model, it is significant at one percent significance level in the NB1 model. The estimated coefficients of *LTO* and *eduy_i* are consistent with a view that those who are forced to leave Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria may choose Europe as their destination in search of better opportunities of higher education as a way to prepare for the future.

Tables 1 and 2 show no stark contrast in the estimation results between the NB1 and NB2 models. Nonetheless, there is some discrepancy between the two models when it comes to conclusion the analysis. This study compares the models using the Akaike information criterion (AIC). The AIC of the NB1 model is smaller than that of the NB2 model, which means that the NB1 model is superior to the NB2 model in forecasting the value of *asylum_{ij}*. The significant variables in the NB1 model imply the following conclusion. First, asylum seekers who move to Europe are not in search of better economic life. Second, they prefer European countries that are more long-term oriented than their homes. Third, they need tertiary education as a way to prepare for the future.

5. Conclusion

This study focuses on the destination determination of asylum seekers using data on the annual numbers of asylum seekers in 22 European countries from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria during the period of 2001 to 2016. First, the study tests significance of three push and pull factors: conflicts in source countries, political stability in destination countries and immigrant stocks in the countries. Findings are as follows. Asylum seekers were pushed out of their homes by conflicts there. The asylum seekers were pulled from the conflict-affected countries into Europe by its stable political system. The asylum seekers were also pulled into countries with large numbers of immigrants from their home countries. These push and pull factors were statistically significant.

Second, this study investigates whether the asylum seekers were economic migrants. A finding is that the asylum seekers preferred countries with low unemployment rates. However, this does not necessarily mean that the asylum seekers were economic migrants. Once asylum applicants are recognised as refugees and settle in a new country, many of them will eventually have to work there. In fact, another finding is that difference in the level of per capita income between source and destination countries did not significantly influence the international flows of asylum seekers.

Third, this study also investigates what sort of societies the asylum seekers preferred. An important finding is that the asylum seekers preferred long-term oriented societies in which thrift and education were highly encouraged. Thus, the asylum seekers needed well-established systems of higher education in preparation for the future. In line with this, another important finding is that the asylum seekers were pulled into countries with high ratios of government spending on tertiary education to GDPs. Therefore, a policy implication would be that it is necessary to provide asylum seekers arriving in Europe not with an opportunity for them to live on welfare but with an opportunity to receive tertiary education for the future.

References

- Angeloni, S. 2016. "Data on Some Socio-Economic Parameters Explaining the Movement of Extra-EU Asylum Seekers in Europe." *Data in Brief*, vol. 9, 966–969.
- Angeloni, S., and F. M. Spano. 2018. "Asylum Seekers in Europe: Issues and Solutions." *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, vol. 19, issue 2, 473–495.
- Beine, M., F. Docquire, and Ç. Özden. 2011. "Diasporas." *Journal of Development Economics*, vol. 95, issue 1, pp. 30–41.
- Belot, M., and S. Ederveen. 2012. "Cultural Barriers in Migration between OECD Countries." *Journal of Population Economics*, vol. 25, no. 3, 1077–1105.
- Collier, P. 2013. *Exodus: How Migration Is Changing Our World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Collier, P., and A. Hoeffler. 2018. "Migration, Diasporas and Culture: An Empirical Investigation." *Kyklos*, vol. 70, no. 1, 86–109.
- Davenport, C. A., W. H. Moore, and S. Poe. 2003. "Sometimes You Just Have to Leave: Domestic Threats and Forced Migration, 1964–1989." *International Interaction*, vol. 29, issue 1, 27–55.
- Day, K., and P. White. 2001. "Choice or Circumstance: The UK as the Location of Asylum Applications by Bosnian and Somali Refugees." *GeoJournal*, vol. 56, issue 1, pp. 15–26.
- Falck, O., A. Lameli, and J. Ruhose. 2018. "Cultural Biases in Migration: Estimating Non-Monetary Migration Costs." *Papers in Regional Science*, vol. 97, no. 2, pp. 411–438.
- Fitzgerald, J., D. Leblang, and J. C. Teets. 2014. "Defying the Law of Gravity: The Political Economy of International Migration." *World Politics*, vol. 66, no. 3, pp. 406–445.
- Hatton, T. J. 2017. "Refugees and Asylum Seekers, the Crisis in Europe and the Future of Policy." *Economic Policy*, vol. 32, issue 91, pp. 447–496.
- Hilbe, J. M. 2011. *Negative Binomial Regression* (2nd Edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lewer, J. J., and H. Van den Berg. 2008. "A Gravity Model of Immigration." *Economics Letters*, vol. 99, no. 1, pp. 164–167.
- Moore, W. H., and S. M. Shellman. 2004. "Fear of Persecution: Forced Migration, 1952–1995." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 40, no. 5, pp. 723–745.
- Neumayer, E. 2004. "Asylum Destination Choice." *European Union Politics*, vol. 5, issue 2, pp. 155–180.
- Neumayer, E. 2005. "Asylum Recognition Rates in Western Europe." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 43–66.
- Rarick, C., G. Winter, G. Falk, I. Nickerson, and C. Barczyk. 2013. "Afghanistan's Younger, Elite and Educated Population: A Cultural Assessment and Possible Implications for the Economic and Political Future of the Country." *Global Journal of Management and Business Research*, vol. 13, no. 4.

White, R. 2016. *Cultural Differences and Economic Globalization: Effects on Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Migration*. Oxford: Routledge.

White, R., and D. Buehler. 2018. “A Closer Look at the Determinants of International Migration: Decomposing Cultural Distance.” *Applied Economics*, vol. 50, no. 33, 3575–3595.




Figure 1: The number of asylum seekers from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria to 22 European countries.

Source: International Migration Database

Table 1: NB1 Model

Coefficient of	Est.	S.E.	Sig. Lv.
Intercept	-9.89	2.81	***
Time Trend	-0.12	0.07	*
Square of Time Trend	1.55e-02	4.20e-03	***
Battle Deaths	5.84	1.21	***
Relative Income	1.04e-05	7.61e-05	
Stock of Immigrants	238	60.0	***
Tertiary Education Expenditures / GDP	0.90	0.23	***
Unemployment Rate (Source)	-2.71e-02	4.57e-02	
Unemployment Rate (Destination)	-0.19	0.02	***
Power Distance	2.09e-02	0.44e-02	***
Individualism	9.75e-05	839e-05	
Masculinity	2.15e-02	0.56e-02	***
Uncertainty Avoidance	-1.23e-02	87.6e-02	
Long Term Orientation	2.51e-02	0.70e-02	***
Political Stability	0.47	0.24	*
Dummy for 2015	1.29	0.23	***

* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%

Note: The Akaike information criterion is 6,579.938.

Table 2: NB2 Model

Coefficient of	Est.	S.E.	Sig. Lv.
Intercept	-12.7	2.26	***
Time Trend	-0.10	0.06	*
Square of Time Trend	1.09e-02	0.30e-02	***
Battle Deaths	2.59	0.92	***
Relative Income	3.15e-04	0.21e-04	***
Stock of Immigrants	41.8	23.8	*
Tertiary Education Expenditures / GDP	0.21	0.20	
Unemployment Rate (Source)	-0.07	0.04	*
Unemployment Rate (Destination)	-0.12	0.02	***
Power Distance	-2.07e-03	2.09e-02	
Individualism	-1.58e-02	0.60e-02	***
Masculinity	9.63e-03	2.71e-03	***
Uncertainty Avoidance	-2.37e-03	4.11e-03	
Long Term Orientation	2.97e-02	0.46e-02	***
Political Stability	0.90	0.20	***
Dummy for 2015	0.56	0.12	***

* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%

Note: The Akaike information criterion is 6,928.805.